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DISABILITY LAW-SUSQUENITA SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RAELEE S.,
PENDENT PLACEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S EXTENSION OF BURLINGTON
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, after failing for decades to provide educational opportunities to
Americans with disabilities, Congress finally acknowledged the educa-
tional rights of those individuals with the passage of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). Although the EAHCA
sought to guarantee a free appropriate public education to persons with
1. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433 ("This Nation has long embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appro-
priate public education is basic to equal opportunity.... Certainly the failure to
provide a right to education to handicapped children cannot be allowed to con-
tinue."); see also Hearings on H.L 5, The IDEA Improvement Act of 1997, Before the
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and Families of the Congressional Comm. on Educa-
tion and the Workforce, 104th Cong. 22-23 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement
of Judith E. Heumann, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Education and Reha-
bilitative Services) (stating that Congress enacted Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA) to assist states in meeting their constitutional obli-
gation to ensure equal protection of law for children with disabilities and their
right to free appropriate public education ("FAPE") and noting further that
before EAHCA's enactment, over 4.5 million children with disabilities were receiv-
ing either inappropriate or no educational services); MILTON BUDOFF ET AL., DUE
PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ON GOING TO A HEARING 4-6 (1982) (noting that
there was exclusion of "slow" children from classroom before reform of educa-
tional legislation); THOMAS G. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
1 (1993) (stating that EAHCA was landmark legislation designed to assure that
children with disabilities received FAPE); ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., LEGAL ISSUES IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION 3-12 (1996) (detailing prior exclusionary policies of educators,
legislators and courts toward students with disabilities and EAHCA requirement
that states provide FAPE to all students with disabilities); STEPHEN B. THOMAS &
CHARLESJ. Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAw: ISSUES & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE '90s 1-
10 (1995) (discussing exclusion of students with disabilities from mainstream edu-
cational systems and enactment of EAHCA and noting historical neglect of individ-
uals with disabilities by government); ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME. ... AND
EDUCATION FOR ALL, PUBLIC POLICY AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 15 (2d ed. 1987)
(noting Senator Robert Stafford's comments during Senate debate over EAHCA:
"We can all agree that all handicapped children should be receiving an education
... [but t]he fact is, our agreeing on it does not make it the case. There are
millions of [handicapped] children . . .who are receiving no services at all.");
Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in
the Interpretations of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 349, 355-64 (1990) (dis-
cussing prior legal exclusion of children with disabilities from public education
and congressional enactment of EAHCA as response thereto); Heather J. Russell,
Note, Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good "IDEA' Suggestions
for Implementing the Carter Decision and Improving the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1479, 1480-81 (1996) (stating that EAHCA was
landmark legislation and marked victory for individuals with disabilities who had
earlier been denied access to free appropriate education).
(1867)
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disabilities, concerns about parental ability to assume financial responsibil-
ity for special education, as well as the appropriateness of that education,
still exist today. 2 The EAHCA was subsequently amended and renamed
The legislative history of the EAHCA discussed the government's prior failure
to provide educational services and opportunities to individuals with disabilities.
See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433 (main-
taining that government failed to treat children with and without disabilities
equally). Additionally, the legislative history recognized the need for legislation to
ensure the rights of individuals with disabilities to FAPE. See id. (stating that "Con-
gress must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of
the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational
opportunity"). For the definition of a FAPE under the Individuals with Disabilities
Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994), see infra note 58 and accompanying
text. The legislative history states that
[o]ne need only to look at public residential institutions to find
thousands of persons [with disabilities] whose families are no longer able
to care for them and who themselves have received no educational serv-
ices .... This Nation has long embraced a philosophy that the right to a
free appropriate public education is basic to equal opportunity and is
vital to secure the future and the prosperity of our people. It is contradic-
tory to that philosophy when that right is not assured equally to all groups
of people within the Nation. Certainly the failure to provide a right to
education to handicapped children cannot be allowed to continue.
S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
2. See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating
that child's receipt of FAPE should not depend on parents' ability to front costs of
private educational placement); see also School Comm. of Burlington v. Depart-
ment of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (noting that parents who find that special
education offered to their child by school district is inappropriate may, if they have
means, pay for placement they consider appropriate); M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch.
Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir.) (noting that financial hardship forced parents to
withdraw their child from what court later determined to be appropriate educa-
tional setting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 176 (1996); Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78
F.3d 859, 865 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that IDEA's stay put provision requires
school districts to finance appropriate educational placement and that cutting off
funds would be change in placement prohibited by IDEA); Carlisle Area Sch. v.
Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 536 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "student's access to a remedy
[for deprivation of FAPE] should not depend on the parents' ability to 'front' the
costs of the education and sue for reimbursement" (quoting Miener v. Missouri,
800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986))), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419 (1996); Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that Congress intended child to
receive FAPE and that this should not depend on parents' ability to "'front' its
costs" (quoting Miener, 800 F.2d at 753)); Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d
Cir. 1988) (stating that child should not be deprived of FAPE because parents
could not afford appropriate private education), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S.
902 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 989 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
financial hardship forced parents to remove their child from what court held to be
appropriate educational setting); Miener, 800 F.2d at 753 (noting that father was
unable to pay for private placement and that school district failed to offer FAPE
during that period and concluding that child's right to FAPE should not turn on
parents' ability to "front" its costs); Delaware County Intermediate Unit No. 25 v.
Martin K., 831 F. Supp. 1206, 1222 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that law should not
force parents to predict their financial ability to pay for child's private education in
event that decision finding parents' private school placement of child was appro-
priate is overturned); Lake Erie Inst. of Rehabilitation v. Marion County, 798 F.
Supp. 262, 263 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (noting father's insufficient financial assets to pay
1868 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 3 The IDEA con-
tains procedural mechanisms and safeguards which are designed to en-
sure that each child under the IDEA receives an education tailored to his
or her special needs at the expense of the school district. 4 Despite these
provisions, disputes arise between parents and school districts as to the
appropriateness of the educational plan or placement and the financial
responsibility therefor.5
Such a dispute was the focus of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Susquenita School District v. Raelee S.6 The court broke
new ground for the rights of disabled students by extending the Supreme
Court's rationale in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education7
to awards of prospective tuition reimbursement. 8 Prospective tuition re-
imbursement imposes financial responsibility on school districts for pen-
dent placements during litigation as soon as an administrative appeals
panel or judicial decision vindicates the parents' opposition to the individ-
ualized education program (IEP) provided by the school district.9 The
Burlington Court only established the right to tuition reimbursement after a
final decision regarding the appropriateness of the IEP had been ren-
for private educational setting in suit seeking tuition reimbursement for that
placement).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994).
4. See id. § 1400(c) (stipulating that purpose of IDEA is to ensure that all chil-
dren with disabilities have FAPE available which emphasizes education and services
that meet child's unique needs); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367 (same).
5. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9 (1993) (resolv-
ing whether parents' placement of child in private school, which was not state
approved, is appropriate placement under IDEA and who must finance such place-
ment); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367 (deciding appropriateness of educational setting
offered by school district versus parents' private school placement of child and
financial responsibility for private placement); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 81 (stating
that court was asked to determine appropriate pendent placement of child and
who should pay for that placement); Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865 (deciding child's pen-
dent placement during course of litigation); Bayonne Bd. of Educ. v. R.S., 954 F.
Supp. 933, 941 (D.N.J. 1997) (deciding child's pendent placement and financial
responsibility for that placement); Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Construction of "Stay-
Put" Provision of Education of the Handicapped Act (20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(3)), That Handi-
capped Child Shall Remain in Current Educational Placement Pending Proceedings Con-
ducted Under Section, 103 A.L.R. FED. 120 (1991) (noting that courts have been
confronted with numerous cases regarding pendent placements).
For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Burlington, see
infra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
6. 96 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 1996).
7. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
8. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 85 (stating rationale of Burlington should not be
confined to awards of retroactive tuition reimbursement, but should be extended
to awards of prospective tuition reimbursement).
9. See id. at 85-86. (stating that policies underlying IDEA require imposition of
financial responsibility upon school district when there has been administrative or
judicial decision establishing appropriateness of placement advocated by parents
and, thus, inappropriateness of school district's proposed individualized education
program).
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dered, otherwise known as retroactive tuition reimbursement.' 0 The
Supreme Court has remained silent about whether prospective tuition re-
imbursement-tuition payable prior to the outcome of litigation-is an
available remedy under the IDEA." Nonetheless, the Third Circuit in Sus-
quenita found the policy rationale expressed in Burlington to warrant the
creation of such relief.12
The issue of retroactive versus prospective tuition reimbursement was
one of first impression for the Third Circuit.'" Consequently, this
Casebrief focuses on the policy behind retroactive tuition reimbursement
awards under the IDEA as the foundation for awarding tuition payments
prior to the outcome of litigation. Part II discusses the history of special
education in the United States and the enactment of the IDEA.' 4 Part III
focuses on the procedural safeguards established to protect the rights of
individuals with disabilities under the' IDEA and the case law establishing
the remedies available for IDEA violations.' 5 Part IV discusses the Third
Circuit's analysis of the IDEA and its remedies in Susquenita.16 Finally,
Part V analyzes the decision's impact on persons with disabilities and their
legal counsel and comments on the potential problems created by the
Third Circuit's decision.' 7
10. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70 (concluding that Congress intended to
offer retroactive tuition reimbursement as remedy when school district's individu-
alized education program (IEP) is deemed inappropriate and parents' private
school placement of child is found to be appropriate educational placement for
child).
11. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84-85, 87 n.10 (stating that Burlington dealt with
retroactive tuition reimbursement and, thus, was not binding precedent in this
case and noting further that at least one other court of appeals has addressed issue
of prospective tuition payments under IDEA).
12. See id. at 86 ("We are convinced that the concerns cited by the Court in
support of retroactive reimbursement favor including the interim assessment of
financial responsibility in the range of relief available under the IDEA.").
13. See id. at 84, 87 n.10 (stating that Burlington was not controlling precedent
and noting that United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was only
other court of appeals to have addressed issue of new pendent placement and
financial responsibility).
14. For a discussion of the history of special education in the United States
before the enactment of the IDEA, see infra notes 18-57 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of IDEA's procedural safeguards designed to protect the
educational rights of individuals with disabilities and remedies available under the
IDEA, see infra notes 58-154 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis of awards of prospective tuition reimbursement, see infra notes 155-
228 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the questions left unanswered by the Third Circuit's
decision in Susquenita, see infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
1870
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA
A. The Civil Rights Movement and Brown v. Board of Education Set the
Stage for the Rights of Children with Disabilities
In the House Hearings on the IDEA, one government official recalled
her own personal experiences with educational discrimination:
I was a child in the 1950's and 60's, too early to benefit from the
IDEA. I was one of more than one million disabled children who
were being denied the right to go to school.
I contracted polio . .. [and w]hen I was five years old and
ready for kindergarten, our... public school would not take me
because I used a wheelchair. Instead, the school system sent a
tutor to my house twice a week. I received exactly two and half
hours of education a week!
Throughout my years as a student, the school system seemed
to continually send me the message that my prospects were lim-
ited and my future unimportant. But my mother and father...
always believed in their hearts that I had a right to an education
However, since there was no law to guarantee that right, my
parents soon learned they had to fight for my right to
achieve....
My parents and hundreds of thousands of others waged a
fight to open the school house doors for their disabled
children. 18
Stories such as that of Judith Herman, Assistant Secretary for Secretary of
Special Education and Rehabilitative Services were common among the
disabled prior to the establishment of their educational rights. 19 The Civil
18. Hearings, supra note 1, at 23-24 (statement of Judith E. Heumann, Assis-
tant Secretary, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services) (recount-
ing her own educational experiences prior to enactment of EAHCA).
19. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 41 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1464 (recognizing inadequate educational services provided to handicapped chil-
dren and that parents were forced to seek such services outside of public school
system at substantial cost).
Before the federal courts and Congress required school districts to provide a
FAPE to children with disabilities, these children were excluded from public
schools. See BUDOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-6 (discussing exclusion of children
with disabilities from public schools); OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 1, 3 (same);
THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 3-6 (same).
Children were often excluded because educators were seldom willing to adapt
educational programs to meet the special needs of children with disabilities. See
THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that school officials even went so far as
to restrict admission of students with disabilities or have them expelled). These
exclusions resulted because behavior that was in fact a manifestation of a child's
disability was instead regarded as misbehavior requiring punishment. See id. at 4
(noting that historically, educators punished students who misbehaved without ex-
amining causes of child's misbehavior). Two cases provide glaring examples of
1997] 1871
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Rights movement and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,20 however, inadvertently provided persons with disabilities with
the constitutional foundation for fighting their wholesale exclusion from
public schools. 2 1 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that "where [a] state
these exclusions. See Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass. 1893)
(affirming expulsion of child with disability from school); State ex rel. Beattie v.
Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 154 (Wis. 1919) (same). In Watson, the court up-
held the suspension from public school because the child was "'so weak in mind as
not to derive any marked benefit from instruction'" and "was 'troublesome to
other children, making unusual noises, pinching others, etc.'" THOMAS & Russo,
supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Watson, 32 N.E. at 864). In Beattie, a child with cerebral
palsy was expelled because: (1) he drooled uncontrollably; (2) he had a speech
impairment and facial contortions; (3) he "had a 'depressing and nauseating' ef-
fect on the teachers and students"; and (4) "'his physical disabilities required an
undue portion of the teacher's time."' Id. (quoting Beattie, 172 N.W. at 154). Even
though the child had the academic ability to benefit from an education, the court
ruled that the child's right to attend public school "'could not be insisted on when
his presence there was harmful to the best interests of the school."' OSBORNE,
supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Beattie, 172 N.W. at 154). Moreover, the Beattie court
indicated that "the school had an 'obligation' to exclude him" because his pres-
ence was contrary to the school's best interests. Id. (citing Beattie, 172 N.W. at
154).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court addressed the rights of African-
American children to have equal access to educational opportunities in a class
action suit brought by African-American students seeking admission to public
schools on a nonsegregated basis. See id. at 487 (examining discrimination claims
brought by African-American students seeking access to public schools on nonseg-
regated basis). The Supreme Court held that when a state has undertaken to pro-
vide educational services, it "is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." Id. at 493 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court coupled this mandate
with the observation that:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance.
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him. to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id.; see OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that this language from Brown has been
quoted either directly or paraphrased by courts in subsequent cases addressing
equal educational opportunities for students with disabilities); WEINER & HUME,
supra note 1, at 27 (noting that Brown decision cleared path for special education
law).
21. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430 (classifying Brown as landmark case establishing child's "right to education"
and noting Supreme Court's mandate in Brown that educational opportunity "'is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms"' (quoting Brown, 347
U.S. at 493)); see also GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 2 (stating "modern legal
history of education for children with disabilities began with Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation" and Supreme Court's holding that "education, 'where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be available to all on equal terms"'
(quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493)); OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that Civil
Rights movement and Brown decision provided initial impetus for movement to
1872
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has undertaken to provide [education], it is a right which must be avail-
able to all on equal terms."22 Unfortunately, for twenty years following
Brown, these rights were established and protected by the federal courts
and not Congress.
B. Landmark Cases of Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens v.
Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education Establish the
Educational Rights of Individuals with Disabilities and
Provide the Impetus for Federal Legislation to
Assure These Rights
The class action cases that are credited with being the foundation of
federal legislation establishing the educational rights of the individuals
with disabilities are Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens v. Penn-
sylvania23 ("PARC') and Mills v. Board of Education.24 In each case, the
plaintiffs sought to establish the right of persons with disabilities not to be
excluded from public schools and the states' obligation to provide them
with a free appropriate public education. 25
In PARC, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed the claims of exclusion brought by thirteen chil-
dren with mental retardation on behalf of such persons.26 Here, the ex-
secure educational rights of students with disabilities); THOMAS & Russo, supra
note 1, at 6 (stating that "[t]he principles of equal educational opportunity enunci-
ated in Brown have ensured its place in history as the cornerstone upon which all
subsequent legal developments protecting the rights of the disenfranchised, in-
cluding individuals with disabilities, are grounded" and thus, "Brown has been ap-
plied in a number of cases involving the disabled"); WEINER & HUME, supra note 1,
at 27 (noting that Supreme Court's decision in Brown "cleared a path for special
education law"); Weber, supra note 1, at 356 (discussing that advocates of persons
with disabilities relied on Brown to gain equal access for students with disabilities to
public schools).
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
23. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
24. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). Both commentators and the legislators
that enacted the IDEA have recognized the importance of the PARC and Mills
decisions in the formation of legislation protecting the educational rights of indi-
viduals with disabilities. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430 (noting that legislation followed landmark cases, which
included PARC and Mills); GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that PARC
and Mills decisions made significant progress in ensuring right to education of
children with disabilities); OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 8-9 (stating that PARC and
Mills cases had "profound effect on the education of students with disabilities in
the United States" and noting procedures mandated therein were foundation of
federal legislation); WEINER & HUME, supra note 1, at 28 ("The PARC agreement
and the Mills ruling laid not just the foundation but some of the building blocks of
[the IDEA].").
25. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868 (noting that plaintiffs with disabilities sought
to enjoin defendants from excluding them from public schools and to compel
defendants to provide plaintiffs with adequate education); PARC, 343 F. Supp. at
283-85 (discussing plaintiffs' challenge to Pennsylvania laws that excluded children
with mental retardation from receiving public education).
26. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82.
1997] CASEBRIEF 1873
7
Kovan: Disability Law - Susquenita School District v. Raelee S., Pendent
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 1867
clusion was a result of state legislation that relieved the state of the
obligation to educate any child deemed by a psychologist to be "unedu-
cable" or "untrainable."2 7 While the Supreme Court had not recognized
the right to education as a fundamental right, the district court acknowl-
edged the plaintiffs' argument, supported by Brown, that at a minimum,
education was a cognizable interest under the Constitution. 28 Raising the
tenet of Brown, that where a state provides educational services it must
provide them to all on an equal basis, the plaintiffs satisfied the court that
there were serious doubts as to the existence of a rational basis for Penn-
sylvania's exclusionary practices. 29 Consequently, the court settled the dis-
pute in favor of the educational rights of persons with disabilities by
endorsing a stipulation and a consent agreement between the parties. 30
The stipulation and the consent agreement were the heart of the district
court's holding in PARC.31 Together, they established that (1) no child
27. Id. at 282. In PARC, there were four Pennsylvania statutes at issue. See id.
at 282 (listing applicable state statutes) (citing 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 13-1304, -
1326, -1330, -1375 (West 1949)). First, section 13-1375 relieved the state of the
obligation to educate any child found to be "uneducable" or "untrainable." Id.
§ 13-1375. This statute shifted the burden for such a child's education to the De-
partment of Welfare, which was also under no legal obligation to educate the
child. See id. (discussing responsibilities of Department of Public Welfare in car-
ing for "uneducable" children). Second, section 13-1304 permitted the indefinite
postponement of admission to public school of any child who had not achieved
the mental age of five. See id. § 13-1304 (stating that "[t]he board of school direc-
tors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who have not attained a mental age
of five years"). Third, section 13-1330 excused a child deemed by a psychologist to
be unable to benefit from education from school attendance. See id. § 13-1330
(stating that students who have been found to be unable to profit from public
school education will not be compelled to attend school). Finally, section 13-1326
defined the compulsory age for school attendance to be from the age of 8 to 17,
but also had been used to postpone admission to public school of retarded chil-
dren until age 8 and also eliminated them from the public schools after the age of
17. See id. § 13-1326 (defining "compulsory school age").
28. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 283 n.8 (stating in response to plaintiffs' argu-
ment that education is fundamental right, that they had at least established "a
colorable constitutional claim even under the less stringent rational basis test").
29. See id. at 298 (responding to plaintiffs' argument that because state has
undertaken to provide public education, it may not entirely deny it to children
with disabilities and concluding, based on Brown, state had failed to provide ra-
tional basis for exclusion of children with disabilities).
30. See id. at 302 (concluding that agreement allowing children with mental
retardation to receive public education is fair and reasonable).
31. See BUDOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 20-21 (discussing consent decree in
PARC as landmark and that IDEA's procedural safeguards are based on PARC con-
sent decree); GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that consent decree in
PARC recognized right to education of child with disability and established proce-
dural safeguards that "'set a detailed model for future advocates"' (quoting
STEVEN S. GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAw 3 (1982))); OsBORNE, supra note 1,
at 8 (stating stipulation and consent decrees established right of child with disabil-
ity to FAPE and that such children could not be excluded from public schools
without due process); WEINER & HUME, supra note 1, at 27-28 (stating that "light-
ning struck" with PARC consent decree finding that children with mental retarda-
tion could benefit from education and were entitled to it). The PARC decision has
1874
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with mental retardation could be excluded from the public schools with-
out due process of law and (2) the state had an obligation to provide these
children with a free appropriate education tailored to their individual
needs.3 2
Only months after PARC, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia followed suit with a similar holding in Mills.3 3 This class
action, brought on behalf of seven children with various disabilities, re-
quested the court to declare their educational rights and to enjoin the
school district from excluding them from public schools.3 4 The school
district conceded that it had an affirmative duty under District of Colum-
bia law to provide the plaintiffs with publicly supported education. 35 Nev-
ertheless, the school district argued that it had insufficient funds to
provide special educational services'. 36 The Mills court rejected the insuffi-
cient funds defense and held that the failure to provide a free public edu-
cation to students with disabilities would not be tolerated because of a lack
of funding.37 More significantly, the Mills court held that under Brown
and similar precedent, the Constitution's Due Process Clause requires a
hearing before public schools can exclude students with disabilities. 38
been credited not only with laying the foundation of the IDEA, but awakening the
public's consciousness. See id. at 28 ("'PARC was a consciousness-raising; it wasn't
just a legal decision. It printed the bumper stickers' for disability rights." (quoting
Reed Martin, attorney with Advocacy Inc., Texas)).
32. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302-16 (setting forth conditions contained in
stipulation and consent agreements).
33. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (conclud-
ing that Board of Education had obligation to provide specialized instruction for
children with disabilities and Board's failure to provide such instruction violated
Board's own regulations and District of Columbia law); see also OSBORNE, supra
note 1, at 8-9 (stating that Mills extended holding of PARC to include other classes
of students with disabilities and also established that lack of funding is insufficient
reason for denying educational services); THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 8 (stat-
ing that "Mills was similar to PARC in that it greatly increased the educational
rights of children with disabilities").
34. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868 (stating that case was founded on two
problems: (1) District of Columbia's failure to provide publicly funded education
to children with disabilities and (2) the exclusion, suspension, expulsion, reassign-
ment and transfer from public school of these children without affording them
due process of law).
35. See id. at 875-76 (discussing Board of Education's failure to comply with
Board of Education regulations and District of Columbia Code).
36. See id. (noting that Board of Education claimed that it would be impossi-
ble to grant plaintiffs relief unless Congress granted millions of dollars in aid to
improve special education services in District of Columbia).
37. See id. at 876 (holding further that if sufficient funds are not available to
provide special educational services, school district must expend its funds in man-
ner which assures "that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported
education consistent with his or her needs and ability to benefit therefrom").
38. See id. at 875 (reasoning that denying FAPE to children with disabilities,
while providing such education to able children, violated Due Process Clause) (cit-
ing Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)). Moreover, the-court
stated that
1997] 1875CASEBRIEF
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Thus, the court ordered the school district to provide each school-age
child with a "free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of
the degree of the child's mental, physical or emotional disability or
impairment."39
The district courts in both PARC and Mills helped to establish the
basic right to an education for all children with disabilities. 4° In reaching
this end and as a means to assure it, both courts set forth detailed man-
dates for the states to follow.4' Consequently, the holdings served not
only to secure the educational rights of individuals with disabilties, but
also provided the actual foundation for the EAHCA. 4 2 Despite these
[n]ot only are plaintiffs and their class denied the publicly supported ed-
ucation to which they are entitled many are suspended or expelled from
regular schooling or specialized instruction or reassigned without any
prior hearing and are given no periodic review thereafter. Due process
of law requires a hearing prior to exclusion, termination of classification
into a special program.
Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Williams v. Dade County Sch.
Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Sch., 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich.
1969)).
39. Id. at 878. The court ordered the establishment of additional safeguards
to ensure that no child with a disability was excluded from the public schools un-
less the child is provided "(a) adequate alternative educational services suited to
the child's needs .... and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and peri-
odic review of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational
alternative." Id. For a further discussion of the Mills decision and its influence on
special education law, see GUERNSEY & KLA.If, supra note 1, at 2; OSBORNE, supra
note 1, at 8-9; THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 6-8 and WEINER & HUME, supra
note 1, at 28-29.
40. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430 (noting legislation followed landmark cases including PARC and Mills);
GUERNSEY & KtA1R, supra note 1, at 2 (noting PARC and Mills decisions made sig-
nificant progress in ensuring right to education of children with disabilities); OS-
BORNE, supra note 1, at 8-9 (stating PARC and Mills cases had "profound effect on
the education of students with disabilities in the United States" and noting proce-
dures mandated therein were foundation of federal legislation); WEINER & HUME,
supra note 1, at 28 ("The PARC agreement and the Mills ruling laid not just the
foundation but some of the building blocks of [the IDEA].").
41. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83 (detailing order of court); Pennsylvania
Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-16 (D.D.C. 1972)
(detailing stipulation and consent agreement).
42. See WEINER & HUME, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that PARC agreement and
Mills ruling ensured rights of students with disabilities and laid groundwork for
IDEA). The schoolhouse doors were not only opened to children with disabilities
by these landmark decisions, but states were also required to locate and evaluate
an individualized program for each child. See id. (discussing state's responsibility
to provide specialized programs for each child with disability). Furthermore, the
PARC and Mills courts prohibited schools from excluding or changing educational
placements of these children without due process of law. See id. (discussing due
process requirement). Finally, rather than being provided an education in isola-
tion, the courts now favored integration of these students with able children. See
id. (stating that "integration was favored over more restrictive placements").
1876 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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cases, there was still no uniform precedent in the United States regarding
the rights of individuals with disabilities to a free public education. 43
The move towards uniformity came when Congress first became in-
volved in special education by passing the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965 (ESEA) .44 The 1966 amendments to the ESEA created
Title VI, which provided grants to states as a means of subsidizing pro-
grams for individuals with disabilities. 45 Finally, in 1970, Congress enacted
the separate Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) .46 Expanding Ti-
tle VI, the EHA increased the financial assistance available to states for
educational programs for individuals with disabilities.
4 7
The next congressional action on behalf of individuals with disabili-
ties came with the enactment of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.48 The statute provided that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
assistance."49 The legislation, however, did not mark the end of Con-
43. See id. (noting lack of applicable clear precedent in states other than
Pennsylvania or District of Columbia).
44. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6310-8962 (1994); seeTHoMAs & Russo, supra note 1, at 22-23
(discussing amendments of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA) that benefited children with disabilities); Weber, supra note 1, at 357-58
(discussing federal legislation impacting on individuals with disabilities and pas-
sage of ESEA).
Congress originally enacted the ESEA in 1964 to aid educationally deprived
children in school districts with a high percentage of low-income families. See
THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that ESEA was not originally
designed to benefit children with disabilities). Nevertheless, students with disabili-
ties were among those served by the ESEA and as such it marked the beginning of
legislation significantly affecting them. See id. (noting that ESEA was subsequently
amended to benefit children with disabilities).
45. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213d
(1994)); see Weber, supra note 1, at 358-59 (discussing amendments to ESEA in
1966). These amendments established Title VI as a means for providing grants to
subsidize the programs for individuals with disabilities. See id. at 358 (discussing
purpose of Title VI).
46. See Weber, supra note 1, at 358 (discussing passage of Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA), Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (1994), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2832)).
47. See THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 22 (noting increased funding avail-
able under EHA); Weber, supra note 1, at 358 (stating that immediately following
passage of EHA, federal subsidies for children with disabilities "increased mark-
edly"). The EHA was the "framework for subsequent federal initiatives in primary
and secondary education of handicapped children." Id.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); see GuERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 2-3 (noting
enactment of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); see also GUERNSEv & KLARE, supra note 1, at 2-3
(discussing enactment of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); OSBORNE,
supra note 1, 12-13 (stating that this legislation was first civil rights legislation to
guarantee rights of individuals with disabilities).
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gress's legislative involvement in special education-rather, it was only the
beginning.
In 1974, Congress amended the ESEA of 1965 to require states receiv-
ing federal funding to give assurances that all children with disabilities
would receive special educational services. 50 More important, these
amendments mandated the creation of procedural safeguards for those
denied a free appropriate education. 5 1 The numerous statutory enact-
ments and amendments in the years after Brown were significant to disabil-
ity rights advocates, yet they nevertheless fell short of providing a level of
enforceability adequate to ensure the educational rights of individuals
with disabilities. 52 The deficiencies in the statutes were highlighted by the
fact that as late as 1975, approximately 1.75 million children with disabili-
ties were receiving no educational services, while another 2.75 million
were in inadequate programs. 53
Congress addressed these deficiencies with the passage of the EAHCA
in which the federal government assumed an increased role in special edu-
cation.54 In 1990, Congress amended the EAHCA and renamed it the In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 55 The passage of the
IDEA and its procedural safeguards had such a significant impact on spe-
cial education that it has become known as the "'Bill of Rights' for the
education of children with disabilities."5 6 Thus, by 1975, more than
twenty years after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, the federal gov-
ernment had finally "'fulfill[ed] the promise of the Constitution that
there shall be equality of education for all people, and [assured] that
handicapped children w[ould] no longer be left out.' 5 7
50. See Weber, supra note 1, at 358-59 (discussing 1974 amendments to
ESEA).
51. See id. at 359 (noting that state must provide assurances of procedural
protections for parents of children who were denied proper education).
52. See id. (stating that "the law still did not provide the enforceability that
advocates of the handicapped believed was necessary").
53. See id. (noting education statistics for children with disabilities) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975)).
54. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1997) (requiring children with disabilities to be
educated, to extent appropriate, in same programs as children without disabilities;
see also THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting increased role of federal
government under EAHCA). The EAHCA was an amendment to the EHA that
completely revised Part B of the EHA. See id. at 23 (discussing effect of EAHCA on
EHA). These revisions contained most of the procedural safeguards now embod-
ied in section 1415 of the IDEA. See DATA RESEARCH, INC., STUDENTS WITH DISABILI-
TIES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 2 (13th ed. 1996) (discussing history of IDEA).
55. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1994) (renaming EAHCA as IDEA); see also DATA
RESEARCH, INC., supra note 54, at 2 (noting renaming of EAHCA to IDEA).
56. THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 23.
57. Id. (quoting 121 CONG. REc. 37,413 (1975) (statement of Sen. Harrison
Williams)).
1878 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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III. THE IDEA: ITS PROMISES AND THE PROCEDURES USED TO KEEP THEM
The fundamental goal of the IDEA is to ensure that children with
disabilities receive a free appropriate public education ("FAPE").58 To
58. See id. at 24 (noting IDEA is designed to ensure FAPE is made available to
all children with disabilities between ages of 3 and 21). The IDEA, however, does
not require a school district to provide a FAPE to a child with a disability after his
or her high school graduation. See Wexler v. Westfield Bd. of Educ., 784 F.2d 176,
182-83 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that state is only required to provide education for
students with disabilities beyond high school graduation to same extent that state
provides such education to students without disabilities). Instead, the IDEA makes
an exception for those students between the ages of 18 and 21, inclusive. See id.
(noting that exception applied when school district sought early termination of its
responsibility to educate students with disabilities by graduating these students ir-
respective of their performance in school). The exception provides that a school
district will not be required to provide a FAPE to those students if that "require-
ment would be inconsistent with State law or practice... respecting public educa-
tion within such age groups in the State." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1994).
Consequently, if a state does not provide a public education beyond high school
for students without disabilities, the school district is not obligated to provide a
FAPE for a student with disabilities. See Wexler, 784 F.2d at 183 (noting that states
are obligated to treat students with and without disabilities equally when providing
education beyond high school graduation). This exception does not apply, how-
ever, to awards of compensatory education if the child has been denied a FAPE
while eligible for one. See id. (awarding child with disability compensatory educa-
tion because of school district's failure to provide FAPE when child was eligible).
For a further discussion of awards of compensatory education, see infra notes 146-
54 and accompanying text.
To be eligible for a FAPE, the child must have a disability within the meaning
of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994) (stating that IDEA's purpose is "to
assure that all children with disabilities have [FAPE] available to them"). "Chil-
dren with Disabilities" are defined as those "(i) with mental retardation, hearing
impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impair-
ments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impair-
ments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and
related services." Id. § 1401 (a) (1) (A) (i)-(ii).
The IDEA defines a FAPE as:
[S]pecial education and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under section 1414(a) (5) of this title.
Id. § 1401 (a) (18)(A)-(D). Additionally, a FAPE is to be designed in a manner
which emphasizes that the special education is to be made available in the least
restrictive environment ("LRE"). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1997) (requiring child
with disability to be educated in least restrictive environment); see also THOMAS &
Russo, supra note 1, at 24-25 (discussing FAPE and goals of IDEA to assure FAPE).
The IDEA defines the term "special education" as "specially designed instruc-
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability, including- (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in
hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical
education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (16) (1994). As stated, these educational services
are to be provided in the LRE in order to foster integration of individuals with
1997] CASEBRIEF 1879
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protect this goal and the educational rights of individuals with disabilities
and their parents, the IDEA contains numerous procedural safeguards de-
tailed in section 1415. 59
A. The Individualized Education Program and Procedural Safeguards
Regarding Disputes Over the Individualized Education Program
Under the IDEA, every school district must develop an IEP for each
child with a disability as the means for providing a FAPE tailored to his or
her unique needs.60 The IEP is essentially a written statement of the
disabilities, rather than their exclusion. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (requiring child
with disability to be educated in least restrictive environment); see also THOMAS &
Russo, supra note 1, at 24 (same).
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (stating purpose of IDEA). Congress, in enacting
the IDEA, set forth its purpose as to "assure that all children with disabilities have
available to them.., a free appropriate public education ... [and] to assure that
the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are pro-
tected." Id.
60. See id. § 1401(a) (20) (stating that IEP is written statement designed to
meet unique need of child with disabilities); see also DATA RESEARCH, INC., supra
note 53, at 3 (noting IEP is procedural device mandated by IDEA to achieve goal
of providing individually tailored education program to students with disabilities);
THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 25-26 (discussing IEP). The IEP has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court as being the "modus operandi" of the IDEA. School
Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985). The IEP
is
a written statement for each child with a disability developed in any meet-
ing by a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate
educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provi-
sion of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of chil-
dren with disabilities, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child,
and whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include-
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational perform-
ance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instruc-
tional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be pro-
vided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be
able to participate in regular educational programs,
(D) a statement of the needed transition services for students
beginning no later than age 16 and annually thereafter (and,
when determined appropriate for the individual, beginning at
age 14 or younger), including, when appropriate, a statement of
the interagency responsibilities or linkages (or both) before the
student leaves the school setting,
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of
such services, and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures
and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis,
whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
In the case where a participating agency, other than the educational
agency, fails to provide agreed upon services, the educational agency
shall reconvene the IEP team to identify alternative strategies to meet the
transition objectives.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (20).
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child's present educational level, performance and annual goals, and es-
tablishes methods to attain these goals.
6 1
Having recognized the failure of the government and the courts to
protect the due process rights of students with disabilities, the IDEA also
establishes numerous procedural safeguards to prevent the exclusion of
students with disabilities without due process.6 2 Sections 1415(b)-(e) of
the IDEA guarantee this due process. 63 These sections establish the right
to administrative and eventual judicial review as a means of challenging
the educational services provided by the school district. 64 To prevent
school districts from changing the educational placement of students with
disabilities, section 1415(e) (3) (A) requires that, pending administrative
and judicial review, the child remain in his or her then current educa-
tional placement unless his or her parents and the state agree otherwise.
65
61. See DATA RESEARCH, INC., supra note 54, at 3 (defining IEP).
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)-(e) (1994) (enumerating procedural safeguards
of IDEA); see also S. REP. No. 94-168, at 12, 14 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1436, 1438 (noting that procedural safeguard of IEP is in-
tended to provide parents with opportunity to participate in planning child's edu-
cation and to protect right of child with disability to FAPE). Additionally,
Congress intended "to provide and reinforce procedural protections for parents
and children in all matters relating to the educational process." S. REP. No. 94-
168, at 14 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1438; see also Burlington, 471
U.S. at 373 (acknowledging Congress's concern over exclusion of children with
disabilities from public schools and stating one purpose of section 1415(e) (3) (A)
was to prevent school officials from excluding child with disability without review
process).
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)-(e) (detailing procedural safeguards of IDEA).
Commentators have recognized the safeguards implemented in the IDEA as an
assurance that a child with a disability receives a FAPE and that disagreements over
the IEP are resolved in accordance with due process. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra
note 1, at 8 (noting that if disagreements arise between parents and school district
about IEP, either party may request due process hearing); OSBORNE, supra note 1,
at 12 (stating that IDEA "contains very elaborate due process safeguards to protect
the rights of students and ensure that its provisions are enforced"); THOMAS &
Russo, supra note 1, at 61 (stating "student's substantive right to special education
under the IDEA is accompanied by the safeguard of procedural due process"). See
generally THOMAS & Russo, supra note 1, at 61-70 (discussing IDEA procedural safe-
guards in depth).
64. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b), (d) (establishing right to administrative and judi-
cial review). Section 1415 (b) provides for the independent evaluation of the child,
written notice to the parents prior to a change or a refusal to change an IEP and
the right to administrative review by an impartial hearing officer of complaints. See
id. § 1415(b) (listing parents' rights with regard to education of child with disabil-
ity). Additionally, if a parent or the school district is not satisfied with the decision
rendered at the hearing, that party may appeal that decision to the state educa-
tional agency for an impartial review of that decision. See id. § 1415(c) (providing
that "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in ... a hearing
[under section 1415(b)(2)] may appeal to the State educational agency which
shall conduct an impartial review of such hearing"). Finally, either party may ap-
peal the decision of a state educational appeals panel by filing a civil action in a
state or federal court. See id. § 1415(e) (1)-(2) (detailing appeals process).
65. See id. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (stating that child cannot be moved from his or
her educational placement unless certain requirements are met).
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This provision is known as the "stay put" or "pendent placement" provi-
sion. 66 The stay put provision is intended to be used by parents who wish
to prevent a change in their child's IEP.6 7 Consequently, in the majority
of cases, the stay put provision has been invoked to prevent the state from
removing a child from a public school placement and placing him or her
in a special education private school.6 8
On occasion, however, parents are dissatisfied with the IEP offered in
the public school setting and opt to place their child in a private school.69
Such placements are regarded as "unilateral placements" because the par-
ent acts against the school district's recommendations for the education of
the child in the public school.70 In this context, the issue of financial
responsibility for placement arises.7 1 Factors that are central to the resolu-
tion of such disputes are: (1) whether the IEP offered by the school dis-
trict was inappropriate and the parents' unilateral placement was
appropriate; (2) whether the state has agreed to the private school as the
66. See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting
that section 1415(e) (3) (A) has become known as stay put or pendent placement
provision and further commenting that provision "was included in the IDEA to
protect handicapped children and their parents during the [IEP] review process").
The stay put provision requires that
[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B), during the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the
child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such
child, or, if applying for initial admission to public school, shall, with the
consent of the parents or guardian, be placed in the public school pro-
gram until all such proceedings have been completed.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A).
67. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (noting that one purpose of section
1415(e).(3) (A) was to prevent school districts from removing child "from public
school classroom over the parents' objection pending completion of the review
proceedings"); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83 (emphasizing "protective purpose" of stay
put provision and that it is invoked by parents to block school districts from unilat-
erally changing their child's educational placement); see also DATA RESEARCH, INC.,
supra note 54, at 68-74 (discussing stay put provision as preventing school districts
from changing child's educational placement over parents' objections).
68. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (discussing purpose of section 1415
(e) (3) (A)); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83 (noting purpose and function of stay put
provision).
69. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993) (not-
ing parents contested appropriateness of proposed IEP and eventually unilaterally
placed their child in private school specializing in learning disabilities); Burlington,
471 U.S. at 362 (noting parents found school district's proposed IEP inappropriate
and unilaterally placed their child in private school at their own expense); Sus-
quenita 96 F.3d at 83 (stating that parents were dissatisfied with IEP and chose to
place child in private school rather than to invoke stay put provision).
70. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74 (discussing parents' change in child's
educational placement from public to private school as unilateral change in
placement).
71. See id. at 367 (statirig that case presents issue as to who is financially re-
sponsible for child's private school placement when parties dispute appropriate-
ness of that placement).
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pendent placement of the child during litigation; and finally (3) whether
financial responsibility for the unilateral placement should be in the form
of retroactive or prospective tuition reimbursement. 72
The resolution of either of the first two factors in favor of the parents
will result in an award of tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. 73 The
IDEA, however, states only that a court "shall grant such relief as the court
determines appropriate."74 Therefore, to fashion relief under the IDEA,
the courts must interpret what relief is "appropriate" under the IDEA.75
Forms of relief that courts have found appropriate include retroactive tui-
tion reimbursement, compensatory education and attorneys' fees. 76 Be-
72. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 81 & n.3 (discussing district court's establish-
ment of private school as Raelee's pendent placement and noting that this deci-
sion "effectively decided the reimbursement question in favor of Raelee's parents"
and, finally, noting issue of whether such reimbursement is'imposed retroactively
or prospectively).
73. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74 (awarding retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment when IEP was found to be inappropriate and determining that unilateral
parental placement was appropriate placement); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84 (stating
that once state has agreed to new pendent placement, school district's financial
responsibility for that placement follows and discussing issue of retroactive versus
prospective tuition reimbursement).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1994); see Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (stating that
IDEA only requires that relief be "appropriate").
75. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70 (stating that, to interpret what is "appro-
priate" relief under IDEA, court must look to purpose of statute, which is to pro-
vide FAPE to students with disabilities).
76. See id. at 369 (recognizing retroactive tuition reimbursement as remedy
available under section 1415(e) (2) of IDEA); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865,
873 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that compensatory education was appropriate remedy
under section 1415(e) (2) when child had been denied FAPE during years for
which he was eligible to receive FAPE); Miene'r v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th
Cir. 1986) (same); see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 (1984) (denying
award of attorneys' fees under IDEA), superseded by Handicapped Children's Pro-
tection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e) (4) (B)-(G)).
Section 1415(e) (4) (B) provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought
under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys'
fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a child or youth with a
disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). For a further
discussion of awards of attorneys' fees, see GUERNSEY & KLAE, supra note 1, at 209-
23.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington, compensatory educa-
tion was found to be an appropriate remedy under the IDEA. See Miener, 800 F.2d
at 753 (extending rationale of Burlington to awards of compensatory education).
Claims for compensatory education arise when it is alleged that a student with
disabilities has been deprived of his or her right to a FAPE. See DATA RESEARCH,
INC., supra note 54, at 177 (stating that "[t] he belated provision of necessary educa-
tional services by a school district to a student with a disability is described as com-
pensatory education"). In Miener, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that "[f]ike the retroactive reimbursement in Burlington,
imposing liability for compensatory educational services . . . 'merely requires
[school districts] to belatedly pay expenses [they] should have paid all along."'
Miener, 800 F.2d at 753 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71); see also Lester H.,
916 F.2d at 873 (awarding compensatory education when school district had failed
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cause the newest remedy promulgated by the Third Circuit in Susquenita
deals with a form of tuition reimbursement, this Casebrief focuses its dis-
cussion on tuition reimbursement.
B. Retroactive Tuition Reimbursement: An Appropriate Remedy Under the
1DEA
The Supreme Court has determined that retroactive tuition reim-
bursement is appropriate relief under the IDEA.77 In Burlington, the
Court addressed a claim for retroactive tuition reimbursement by parents
who had unilaterally placed their child in a private school because they
were dissatisfied with the IEP that the school district offered. 78 At issue in
the case was whether the potential relief available under section
1415(e)(2) included tuition reimbursement for private school and
whether section 1415(e) (3) (A) barred the parents' claim for reimburse-
ment because they had unilaterally placed their child in private school. 79
The Court found in favor of retroactive tuition reimbursement as an ap-
propriate remedy under the IDEA. 80 Such relief is available under section
1415(e) (3) (A) if a court ultimately determines both that the unilateral,
private school placement was appropriate and that the IEP was an inap-
propriate placement.8 ' In establishing this remedy, the Supreme Court
affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's holding
to place child with disability in appropriate school). For a further discussion of
compensatory education, see infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
77. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 360 (finding that retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment is appropriate relief under IDEA because to deny such relief would frustrate
child's right to FAPE, parent's right to participate fully in developing proper IEP
and procedural safeguards of IDEA).
78. See id. at 362.
79. See id. at 367 (detailing issues raised on appeal from United States Court
of Appeals for First Circuit).
80. See id. at 374 (establishing remedy as retroactive tuition reimbursement
under IDEA).
81. See id. at 369 (stating that IDEA gives courts power to order school districts
"to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a
child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a pro-
posed IEP, is proper under the Act"). Parents, however, who violate section
1415(e) (3) (a)'s pendent placement provision and incur the costs of private educa-
tion do so at their own financial risk. See id. at 373-74 (noting that section
1415(e) (3)[(A)] is safeguard largely for benefit of parents and child, yet that does
not mean "that [section] 1415(e)(3)[(A)] has no effect on parents .... [The
provision] operates in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child's
placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of
state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk."). Under Burlington,
if a court ultimately determines the IEP to be the appropriate placement for the
child, the parents will be barred by section 1415(e) (3) (A) from obtaining tuition
reimbursement for any interim period that their unilateral placement violated sec-
tion 1415(e) (3) (A). See id. at 374 (noting parents assume financial risk of unilater-
ally changing child's school).
1884
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that in fashioning relief under the IDEA, equitable considerations are
relevant.8 2
The equitable considerations of primary relevance to the Supreme
Court in Burlington were the purposes of the IDEA.83 The Court reiter-
ated that the IDEA principally seeks to provide individuals with disabilities
with a FAPE that emphasizes each child's special needs. 84 Consequently,
if a court were to find that the public school was unable to provide a FAPE,
that court could order a prospective injunction requiring the school dis-
trict to develop and implement an IEP for private special education at
public expense.8 5 The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the re-
view process under the IDEA is generally ponderous and often takes sev-
eral years.8 6 Therefore, the Court concluded that prospective injunctive
relief is not an adequate remedy under the IDEA.8 7 According to the
Court, the lengthy review process presented parents with two unpalatable
choices if retroactive tuition reimbursement was not available under the
IDEA: (1) parents could acquiesce to the IEP to the detriment of their
child if the IEP was inappropriate or (2) parents could unilaterally place
the child in private school at their own expense.8 8 Regardless of that
choice, without tuition reimbursement, the Court recognized that it would
be a Pyrrhic victory for parents to later learn that their assertions were
correct; they had nonetheless either sacrificed years of their child's educa-
tion or were not entitled to tuition reimbursement for the proper place-
ment in private school.8 9 According to the Burlington Court, such a result
would undermine the child's rights to a FAPE and the procedural safe-
82. See id. (stating that court of appeals was correct in its interpretation of
section 1415 (e)(2)'s language, "such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"
as meaning that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief).
83. See id. at 369 (applying IDEA's purposes in analysis).
84. See id. (noting purpose of IDEA is to provide FAPE to children with disa-
bilities and that relief under IDEA should be "appropriate in light of th [is] pur-
pose of the Act").
85. See id. at 369-70 (stating that when court determines that private place-
ment was appropriate instead of IEP in public school, "it seems clear beyond cavil
that 'appropriate' relief would include a prospective injunction directing the
school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the
child in a private school").
86. See id. at 370 (stating "review process is ponderous" and noting that final
judicial decision on merits of IEP will usually come more than one year after
school term covered by IEP has passed).
87. See id. (noting that prospective injunction relief would be sufficient if "re-
view under the Act could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years").
88. See id. (noting that without retroactive tuition reimbursement, IDEA's
lengthy review process would require parents to choose between going along with
inappropriate IEP or placing child in appropriate educational setting at their own
expense, yet without possibility of reimbursement).
89. See id. (detailing parents' "empty victory").
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guards of the IDEA.90 Therefore, because Congress did not intend either
to occur, the Court held that retroactive tuition reimbursement is the only
relief that would simultaneously ensure a child's right to a FAPE and give
complete effectiveness to the procedural safeguards of the IDEA.9
Turning its focus to the stay put provision of the IDEA, the Supreme
Court held that the provision should not be used to force parents to keep
their children in what parents deem an inappropriate educational set-
ting.92 Instead, Congress intended parents to use section 1415(e) (3) (A)
to prevent inappropriate changes in their child's placement. 93 As such,
although section 1415(e) (3) (A) prohibits school districts from changing
the child's pendent placement, it does not prohibit parents from doing
so.9 4 Rather, the Burlington Court stated that parents are free to change
their child's placement during litigation and place their child in private
school, but at their own financial risk.9 5 If the school district's IEP is ulti-
mately determined by a court to have been an appropriate placement, sec-
90. See id. (finding that such result would make "child's right to [FAPE], the
parents' right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the proce-
dural safeguards ... less than complete").
91. See id. (noting that "[b]ecause Congress undoubtedly did not intend this
result, we are confident... Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement
... as an available remedy"); see also S. REP. No. 94-168, at 32 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1456 (stating that disagreements and question of finan-
cial responsibility are to be determined by due process procedures); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.403(B) (1997) (same). As the Supreme Court in Burlington noted, the
IDEA's legislative history requires that:
"If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent's own'
expense, to seek private schooling for the child because an appropriate
program does not exist within the local educational agency responsible
for the child's education and the local educational agency disagrees, that
disagreement and the question of who remains financially responsible is a mat-
ter to which the due process procedures established under [the predeces-
sor to § 1415] appl[y]."
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting S.
REP. No. 94-168, at 32 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1456); see 34
C.F.R. § 300.403(b) (1997) (same).
92. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (rejecting school district's argument that
section 1415(e) (3) (A) requires parents to leave child in pendent placement dur-
ing litigation). In fact, the Court held that section 1415(e) (3) (A) is a procedural
safeguard for parents, not school districts. See id. (stating further that "at least one
purpose of § 1415(e) (3) (A) was to prevent school officials from removing a child
from the regular public school classroom over the parents' objection pending
completion of review proceedings"). Therefore, because the IDEA seeks to ensure
that children with disabilities receive a FAPE, section 1415(e) (3) (A) should not be
interpreted to defeat either purpose by requiring parents to leave their child in
what may later be deemed an inappropriate placement or by permitting a change
in placement "only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement." Id. at 373-74.
93. See id. at 373 (noting Congress's desire to prevent exclusion of individuals
with disabilities from public schools which occurred in past).
94. See id. (concluding that section 1415(e) (3) (A) is primarily for protection
of children with disabilities and their parents).
95. See id. at 373-74 (noting operation of statute).
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tion 1415(e) (3) (A) will bar the parents' right to reimbursement for any
period they violated the statute.96
In addition, the Supreme Court interpreted the language of section
1415(e) (3) (A), which requires the child to remain in his or her then cur-
rent placement "unless the state and the parents otherwise agree."9 7 The
Court stated that a decision by a state's special education appeals panel in
favor of the parents' unilateral, private school placement can constitute an
agreement by the state to change the child's pendent placement within
the meaning of section 1415(e) (3) (A). 9 8 Such an agreement, therefore,
changes the child's pendent placement and means that the parents are no
longer violating section 1415(e) (3) (A) as of the date of that agreement. 99
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington clearly estab-
lished that parents are entitled to retroactive tuition reimbursement for
the unilateral, private placement of their child as long as a court ultimately
determines that this placement was the appropriate one for the child. 10 0
Moreover, in the eyes of the Court, the grant of such relief is not an award
of "'damages' . . . [because it] merely requires [a school district] to belat-
edly pay expenses it should have paid all along and would have borne in
the first instance had it developed a proper IEP." 10 1
Finally, as the Supreme Court later warned in Florence County School
District Four v. Carter,10 2 school districts who wish to avoid reimbursing par-
ents for their unilateral private placements "can do one of two things: give
the child a [FAPE] in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate
private setting of the State's choice. This is the IDEA's mandate, and
school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement
claims." 103
96. See id. at 374 ("'If a handicapped child has available a [FAPE] and the
parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility the [school] ... is
not required.., to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility.'"
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.403)).
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (1994); see Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371-72 (ana-
lyzing section 1415(e) (3) (A)).
98. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (interpreting language of section
1415(e) (3) (A)).
99. See id. (noting parents were no longer in violation of section
1415(e) (3) (A) after state Bureau of Special Education Appeals' decision approved
of parents' unilateral, private school placement).
100. See id. (holding father's change of child's placement during administra-
tive proceedings did not bar reimbursement).
101. Id. at 370-71.
102. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
103. Id. at 15. Florence also involved a claim for retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment by parents who had unilaterally placed their child in a private school. Id. at
9. It was, however, distinguishable from Burlington because the parents in Florence
placed their child in a private school that did not meet all of the requirements of
the IDEA's section 1401(a)(18). See id. Consequently, the Court addressed the
narrow issue of whether the parents were barred from recovering retroactive tui-
tion reimbursement because the school did not meet the section 1401 (a) (18) defi-
nition of a FAPE. See id. at 12 (stating that issue on appeal was whether court may
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C. Pendent Placement and Tuition Reimbursement in the Third Circuit
Although the IEP is regarded as the "modus operandi"10 4 to ensure
that a child with a disability receives a FAPE tailored to his or her special
needs, the stay put provision is the primary procedural safeguard invoked
by parents to assure their child's continued access to a FAPE. 10 5 Addition-
ally, when a school district either fails to maintain the pendent placement
or the parents' unilateral, private placement is deemed "appropriate," ret-
roactive tuition reimbursement is available as a means of assuring the
child's access to a FAPE. 106 The Third Circuit has recognized the stay put
provision and retroactive tuition reimbursement as essential to the mainte-
nance of the educational rights of children with disabilities.
10 7
order reimbursement for parents who place child in private school that does not
meet statutory requirements). The Supreme Court held that section
1401 (a) (18)'s requirements apply to school district placement, but not to parental
placements. See id. at 13 (allowing parents reimbursement for education costs).
Therefore, the Florence Court extended the decision of Burlington to awards of ret-
roactive tuition reimbursement for unilateral placements even if that placement
does not qualify as a FAPE under section 1401(a)(18). See id. at 13-14 ("To read
the provisions of [section] 1401(a) (18) to bar reimbursement in the circumstances
of this case would defeat th[e] statutory purpose."). For a detailed analysis of the
Florence decision, see Russell, supra note 1, at 1496-1505. For the statutory language
of section 1401 (a) (18), see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
104. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368 (stating that IEP as "modus operandi" of
IDEA is comprehensive statement of educational needs of child with diability and
specially designed education and services to be utilized to meet those needs).
105. See id. at 373 (stating one purpose of stay put provision is to prevent
school officials from changing child's placement over parents' objections, but was
not intended to prevent parents from changing their child's placement); Sus-
quenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting protective
purpose of stay put provision and that it is utilized by parents "to block school
districts from effecting unilateral change[s]" to their child's educational
program).
106. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (holding that if retroactive tuition reim-
bursement was not available remedy under IDEA, then child's right to FAPE would
be less than complete and stating that Congress did not intend this result).
107. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83-84 (stating stay put provision was intended to
protect children with disabilities and their parents during review process and rec-
ognizing importance of retroactive tuition reimbursement as means to ensuring
that child with disability receives FAPE); M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d
389, 395 (3d Cir.) (acknowledging tuition reimbursement as "vehicle for satisfying
both IDEA's pronouncement that children are entitled to [FAPE] and the con-
gressional intent to provide relief for the deprivation of this right" (citing Lester
H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990))), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 176 (1996);
Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating, in case for
retroactive tuition reimbursement, that language of stay put provision is "'unequiv-
ocal'" in that it requires child to remain in his or her current educational place-
ment during review process, was intended to strip school districts of their
traditional unilateral authority to exclude children with disabilities and implicitly
mandates school district's financial responsibility to maintain placement. (quoting
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988))); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62
F.3d 520, 536 (3d Cir. 1995) (acknowledging Supreme Court's holding in Burling-
ton that retroactive tuition reimbursement is appropriate remedy under IDEA),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419 (1996); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.J.H., 42 F.3d 149,
[Vol. 42: p. 18671888
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The stay put provision of the IDEA is generally invoked by parents
who wish to prevent a change in their child's current educational place-
ment.10 8 As such, in Drinker v. Colonial School District,10 9 the Third Circuit
stated that the provision acts as an "automatic preliminary injunction" that
157 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming "right to [retroactive] reimbursement for private
tuition incurred from a unilateral enrollment during the pendency of any pro-
ceeding if it is ultimately determined that the IEP in question was inappropriate")
(citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370); Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872 (stating that retroac-
tive tuition reimbursement "addresses '[a] child's fight to a [FAPE],' and satisfies
congressional intent to provide relief that remedies the deprivation of that right"
(quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370)); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d
Cir. 1982) (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement in pre-Burlington case and
stating that stay put provision requires school district's financial maintenance of
that placement and concluding that failure to do so violated stay put provision);
Bayonne Bd. of Educ. v. R.S., 954 F. Supp. 933, 940-41 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting stay
put provision as important procedural safeguard of IDEA and policy concerns un-
derlying it); N.S. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 875 F. Supp. 273, 275 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (recognizing parents' right to seek retroactive tuition reimbursement as un-
disputed if child fails to receive appropriate FAPE); B.G. v. Cranford Bd. of Educ.,
702 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 & n.4 (D.N.J. 1988) (recognizing parents' right to retroac-
tive tuition reimbursement when school district fails to provide child with appro-
priate FAPE and stating that stay put provision is means of ensuring that school
district does not exclude child without complying with IDEA's due process require-
ments), aff'd, 882 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83-84 (discussing parental use of stay put provi-
sion as means of maintaining child's placement).
109. 78 F.3d 859 (3d Cir. 1996). The Drinker court awarded retroactive tui-
tion reimbursement to the parents for the school district's failure to maintain the
then current placement. See id. at 868 (ordering school district to "reimburse all
costs billed to the [parents] for [the child's] education").
In Drinker, a child with a disability, Daniel, lived within the Colonial School
District. See id. at 861. Because the Colonial School District lacked the means to
educate Daniel, he was placed in a program at the Gladwyne Elementary School in
the neighboring Lower Merion School District. See id. The Colonial School Dis-
trict paid approximately $25,000 a year for Daniel's education. See id. The follow-
ing year, the Colonial School District claimed that it had developed an appropriate
program in its own school district. See id. Consequently, the school district noti-
fied his parents that it would change his placement to a school within the Colonial
School District. See id. The parents disagreed with the change in placement and
invoked their rights to a hearing under section 1415(b) (2) of the IDEA. See id.
The hearing officer held that Colonial could change Daniel's placement, but
not until the beginning of the 1994-95 school year and not until a transition plan
had been completed. See id. at 861-62. Subsequently, both the state appeals panel
and the Third Circuit noted the hearing officer's failure to find that Colonial's
unilateral change in Daniel's Notice of Recommended Assignment ("NORA") had
violated Daniel's rights under the IDEA. See id. at 861 n.3. Colonial contended
that the delay in the change in placement was too long and appealed. See id. at
862. On appeal, the three-judge administrative panel agreed with Colonial and
moved up the date for Daniel's change in placement. See id. The parties, however,
failed to develop a transition plan for Daniel because of his parents' refusal to
cooperate with Colonial. See id. Consequently, on April 25, 1994, the date that the
appeals panel had determined as the date for a change in Daniel's placement,
Colonial stopped paying for Daniel's education at Gladwyne Elementary School.
See id. Daniel, nevertheless, remained at Gladwyne. See id. Daniel's parents paid
his tuition until they exhausted their financial resources. See id.
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prevents school districts from unilaterally changing a child's IEP or place-
ment.110 Moreover, implicit in the maintenance of the pendent place-
ment is the requirement that the school district continues to finance it
until the dispute is resolved.1 ' Consequently, a school district's failure to
fund a pendent placement during litigation is regarded as a unilateral
change in placement by the school district and, thus, is prohibited under
the IDEA."
2
The stay put provision requires a child to remain in his or her then
current educational placement pending the outcome of litigation.113 In
two situations, however, this mandate does not apply. 1 4 First, as the
Supreme Court in Burlington held, section 1415(e)(3)(A) does not bar
110. Id. at 864 (citing Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982)).
Because section 1415(e) (3) (A) functions as an "automatic preliminary injunction"
against a proposed change in a child's IEP/placement, the Third Circuit adopted
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's reasoning in Zvi that
the standard for granting a preliminary injunction under section 1415(e) (3) (A) is
different than the traditional inquiry. for preliminary injunctions. See id. ("' [T] he
statute substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discre-
tionary consideration of factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits or a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships."'
(quoting Zvi, 694 F.2d at 906)).
111. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865 (stating that "[i]mplicit in the maintenance of
the status quo is the requirement that a school district continue to finance an
educational placement made by the agency and consented to by the parent ....
'To cut off public funds would amount to a unilateral change in placement,"'
which IDEA prohibits (quoting Zvi, 694 F.2d at 906)).
112. See id. (citing Monohan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1089 (D. Neb.
1980), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 645 F.2d 592, 597-98 (8th Cir.
1981)).
In Burlington, the Supreme Court acknowledged that section 1415(e) (3) (A)
requires a child to remain in his or her then current educational placement-to
stay put-pending litigation. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373 (1985) (noting that provision arose from parents' efforts
to prevent unilateral expulsion or exclusion of their children from public schools).
Therefore, the stay put provision was enacted with the intent to prevent school
districts from unilaterally changing a placement of a child with a diability. See id.
(noting purpose of provision "was to prevent school officials from removing a
child from the regular public school classroom over the parents' objection pend-
ing completion of the review proceedings"). Consequently, the Burlington Court
concluded that section 1415(e) (3) (A) is a "procedural safeguard[ ] [that is]
largely for the benefit of the parents and [their] children [with disabilities]. Id.
In Grymes, the Third Circuit, in a pre-Burlington decision, awarded tuition re-
imbursement to parents. See Grymes, 672 F.2d at 322. The court held that the
school district's withdrawal of funding for tuition violated the stay put provision of
the IDEA, which requires the "'maintenance of a current educational placement
during the pendency of any proceeding.'" Id. at 323 (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e) (3) (A) (1994)).
113. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (setting forth stay put provision). For the
language of section 1415(e) (3) (A), see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (stating that section 1415(e) (3) (A) does
not bar parents from changing child's pendent placement, but they do so at their
own financial risk); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that stay put provision may not be used by school district to force parents
to maintain child in public school placement).
1890 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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parents from unilaterally changing the child's placement at any time. 115
Second, the pendent placement may be changed under section
1415(e) (3) (A) if the "[s]tate or local educational agency and the parents
... agree." 116 If such an agreement is made, a new pendent placement is
established under section 1415(e) (3) (A) and must likewise be maintained
during litigation.
1 17
Disputes arise, however, as to what qualifies as the child's pendent
placement that must be maintained under section 1415(e) (3) (A).' 1 8 The
Third Circuit has determined that the dispositive factor for determining
the child's "'current educational placement' [is] ... the 'IEP' . . . actually
If during the administrative review process, a state education appeals panel
finds the parents' unilateral private school placement to be appropriate, this will
constitute an agreement under the stay put provision. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at
372 (stating that section 1415(e) (3) (A) requires agreement by "either the State or
the local education agency," and concluding Massachusetts Department of Educa-
tion's Bureau of Special Education Appeals' ("BSEA") decision in favor of parents'
private school placement "seem[ed] to constitute agreement by the State to the
change of placement" (emphasis added)). Thus, a new pendent placement is cre-
ated and from the date of such decision forward, parents' unilateral change in
placement is no longer regarded as a violation of that section for the purpose of
eligibility for retroactive tuition reimbursement. See id. (noting that BSEA's deci-
sion changed pendent placement and as of date'of that decision, parents were no
longer in violation of section 1415 (e) (3) (A)); see also Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83-84
(stating that appeals panel's agreement that parents' unilateral private school
placement was appropriate created new pendent placement under section
1415(e) (3) (A) and school district thus became financially responsible for that
placement).
115. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74 (stating that court could not order par-
ents to leave child in what they deem inappropriate placement under section
1415(e) (3) (A)); see also Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.J.H., 42 F.3d 149,157 (3d Cir.
1994) (affirming parents' right to unilaterally place child in private school and
seek retroactive tuition reimbursement); N.S. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 875
F. Supp. 273, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating it is undisputed that if school district fails
to provide child with FAPE, parents may unilaterally place their child in private
educational program and seek tuition reimbursement). For a further discussion of
unilateral placements and retroactive tuition reimbursement, see DATA RESEARCH,
INC., supra note 54, at 125-43 and THoMAs & Russo, supra note 1, at 66-67.
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (stating
education appeals panel decision constitutes agreement to new pendent place-
ment within meaning of section 1415(e) (3) (A)); Susquenita, 76 F.3d at 83 (same).
For the complete language of section 1415(e) (3) (A), see supra note 66 and accom-
panying text.
117. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83-84 (stating that agreement by education ap-
peals panel created new pendent placement and that agreement imposes financial
responsibility on school district to pay for that placement); Grymes, 672 F.2d at 323
(stating that section 1415(e) (3) (A) requires school districts to maintain pendent
placement and that withdrawal of funding for that placement violates stay put pro-
vision and holding "that continued funding is required until due process proceed-
ings and appeals have been completed").
118. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 81 (noting that issue before court was to decide
practical question of child's pendent placement); see also Drinker v. Colonial Sch.
Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 865-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (resolving issue of pendent placement in
suit for retroactive tuition reimbursement).
25
Kovan: Disability Law - Susquenita School District v. Raelee S., Pendent
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
functioning when the 'stay put' [provision] is invoked."'119 Because the
failure to maintain an IEP or the inappropriateness of an IEP can give rise
to liability for tuition reimbursement during the period, the resolution of
this dispute is critical to the issue of tuition reimbursement.
120
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington, the Third
Circuit recognized retroactive tuition reimbursement as a remedy under
the IDEA. 121 In Gymes v. Madden,122 the school district and State Board
119. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (quoting Woods v. NewJersey Dep't of Educ., 20
Indivs. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 430, 440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17,
1993)). The Third Circuit in Drinker adopted the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in interpreting the meaning of "then cur-
rent educational placement." Id. In one case, the court reasoned that because the
term "then current placement" means the preservation of the status quo, "it refers
to the operative placement actually functioning at the time the dispute first arises.
If an IEP has been implemented, then that program's placement will be the one
subject to the stayput provision." Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618,
625-26 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, in Thomas, the Sixth Circuit noted that if an IEP
has not yet been implemented, the current educational placement will be the "op-
erative placement under which the child is actually receiving instruction at the
time the dispute arises." Id. at 626. The Third Circuit in Drinker agreed with these
definitions of "current educational placement." Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867.
If, however, the child has yet to be enrolled in the public school, section
1415(e) (3) (A) requires that the child, "with the consent of the parents or guard-
ian, be placed in the public school program until all such proceedings have been
completed." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A).
120. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82 (stating that child's pendent placement has
.great significance for all concerned. 'Where as in the present case review of a
contested IEP takes years to run its course-years critical to the child's develop-
ment-important practical questions arise concerning interim placement of the
child and financial responsibility for that placement."' (quoting Burlington, 471
U.S. at 361)); Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865 (discussing liability for retroactive tuition
reimbursement). The Third Circuit in Drinker stated that
"[i] mplicit in the maintenance of the status quo is the requirement that a
school district continue to finance an educational placement made by the
agency and consented to by the parent before the parent requested a due
process hearing. To cut off public funds would amount to a unilateral
change in placement, prohibited by the Act."
Id. (quoting Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982)); see Grymes, 672
F.2d at 323 (stating that school district is required under stay put provision to
financially maintain pendent placement). If a school district's IEP or placement is
found by a court to be inappropriate and the parents' placement to be appropri-
ate, a court will impose financial responsibility on that school district in the form
of retroactive tuition reimbursement. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v.
Carter, 501 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1993) (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement
when school district failed to provide FAPE and parents unilaterally placed child
with disability in private school and further stating that section 1401 (a) (18)'s re-
quirements do not apply to private parental placements); Burlington, 471 U.S. at
369 (recognizing award of retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents' unilat-
eral, private placement was found to be appropriate and school district's IEP
inappropriate).
121. See Giymes, 672 F.2d at 322-23 (affirming district court's award of tuition
reimbursement to parents who incurred costs of maintaining current placement
pending litigation of their claim).
122. 672 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1982).
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had declared James Grymes, a child with a learning disability, ineligible for
financial assistance to attend a private educational facility.1 23 Neverthe-
less, the parents placed James in a private school and sought retroactive
tuition reimbursement from the school district.1 24 Because the school dis-
trict failed to meet its burden of proof as to its ability to provide James with
a FAPE, the Delaware District Court awarded James's parents full tuition
reimbursement. 125 The following year, the school district proposed to
change James's placement to a public school and eventually withdrew fi-
nancial support for the private educational placement. 12 6 The parents
again won full tuition reimbursement. 127 More important, the district
court determined that the school district's withdrawal of funding violated
the stay put provision of the IDEA, which required the "'maintenance of a
current educational placement"' during the pendency of any proceedings
under section 1415(e) (3) (A). 128 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed
not only the award of retroactive tuition reimbursement, but held that
continued funding of a current educational placement is required "until
due process and appeals have been completed."1 29 Since Grymes and the
Supreme Court's decision in Burlington, the Third Circuit and the district
123. See id. at 322 (noting that district court's decision was reached after state
and local level hearings).
124. See id. Initially, the parents only received an award for partial tuition
reimbursement. See id. On appeal to the district court, however, the parents were
awarded full tuition reimbursement. See id.
125. See id. (citing Grymes v. Madden, No. 78-105, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12604, at *11 (D. Del. May 3, 1979)).
126. See id.
127. See id. (noting district court ordered school district to reimburse parents
for that year's tuition).
128. Id. at 322-23 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (1994)).
129. Id. at 323. The Third Circuit noted that both the case law and legislative
history supported its holding. See id. (finding that "[flederal agency interpreta-
tions and existing case law provide ample support" for decision) (citing Monahan
v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980), affd, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981);
Gargani v. School Comm., No. 77-0612, slip op. at 7 (D.R.I. May 4, 1978), affd, 601
F.2d 571 (lst Cir. 1979)). The Giymes holding is significant because it demonstrates
the Third Circuit's early recognition that once a pendent placement is established,
the withdrawal of funding will be deemed a unilateral change in placement, which
is a violation of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (requiring "maintenance
of a current educational placement" during pendency of IDEA proceeding).
Moreover, once the placement is established, as the court in Susquenita held, the
school district's financial responsibility for it follows. See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v.
Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that it is undisputed that once
there is state agreement on pendent placement, school district is financially
responsibile for that placement). Therefore, because failure to maintain a place-
ment is deemed a violation of the IDEA, the financial responsibility for that place-
ment is immediate and may not be postponed. See id. (holding that "from the
point of the panel decision forward . . .and following-Raelee's pendent place-
ment, by agreement of the state, is the private school and Susquenita is obligated
to pay for that placement").
1997] 1893
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courts therein have continually recognized retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment as a remedy under the IDEA. 130
There are three scenarios that can give rise to the award of retroactive
tuition reimbursement: (1) when the parents contest an IEP and unilater-
ally place their child in another school at their own expense; (2) when the
school district fails to maintain the costs of a child's pendent placement;
and (3) when under section 1415(e) (3) (A), the school or state and par-
ents agree to placement, other than the one functioning at the time the
dispute arose.13 Under the first scenario, the right to retroactive tuition
reimbursement is not absolute.13 2 The Third Circuit has followed the
130. See, e.g., Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84 (recognizing retroactive tuition reim-
bursement and extending rationale therefor to awards of prospective tuition reim-
bursement); M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir.)
(acknowledging retroactive tuition reimbursement awards), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
176 (1996); Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 868 (3d Cir. 1996) (award-
ing retroactive tuition reimbursement when school district failed to maintain
child's pendent placement); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 536
(3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing retroactive tuition reimbursement as appropriate re-
lief under IDEA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419 (1996); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.
J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 160 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865,
872 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Board of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir.
1986) (same); Giymes, 672 F.2d at 323 (awarding retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment); Bayonne Bd. of Educ. v. R.S., 954 F. Supp. 933, 943 (D.N.J. 1997) (recog-
nizing retroactive tuition reimbursement awards as available remedy under IDEA);
N.S. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 875 F. Supp. 273, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same);
B.G. v. Cranford Bd. of Educ., 702 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (D.N.J. 1988) (same), affd,
882 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1989).
131. See, e.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9-11
(1993) (noting that parents unilaterally placed child in private school and af-
firming retroactive tuition reimbursement award); School Comm. of Burlington v.
Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (same); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84
(awarding prospective tuition reimbursement when state educational appeals
panel agreed that private school was new pendent placement); Drinker, 78 F.3d at
868 (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement when school district failed to fi-
nancially maintain pendent placement); Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 151 (awarding ret-
roactive tuition reimbursement when parents had unilaterally placed child in
private boarding school that court held was appropriate placement); Diamond, 808
F.2d at 992-93 (affirming award of retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents
unilaterally placed child in private residential setting); Grymes, 672 F.2d at 323
(awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement for school district's failure to finan-
cially maintain pendent placement).
132. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70 (stating that retroactive reimbursement
may be awarded when court determines that school placement was inappropriate
and that parents' placement was appropriate); Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 158-59 (de-
nying award of retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents waited more than
two years to file claim for reimbursement).
In Bernardsville, the parents unilaterally placed their child in a private board-
ing school because of the school district's failure to provide their child with an
education suitable to his special needs. See id. at 151. Two years after this unilat-
eral placement, the parents sought retroactive tuition reimbursement from the
Bernardsville School District. See id. The Third Circuit held that the parents' fail-
ure to bring suit earlier denied the school district the opportunity to modify the
child's IEP and attempt to offer him a FAPE tailored to his needs. See id. at 157-58
(noting school district serves large student population, and given numerous con-
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mandate of Burlington in awarding this remedy. 133 In cases similar to Bur-
lington in which parents have unilaterally changed the child's placement, a
court will award tuition reimbursement only when it has made the follow-
ing two findings: (1) that the IEP offered by the school district is inappro-
priate and (2) that the parents' placement is appropriate.' 34 These
requirements, however, do not apply under the second scenario when the
parents invoke the stay put provision and the school district is required to
maintain that placement.' 35 Instead, a court will award retroactive tuition
reimbursement for the school district's failure to maintain the placement
as the Third Circuit did in Grymes.l 3 6 Finally, under the third scenario, the
tacts it has with parents, "mere notice of parental 'dissatisfaction' does not alone
put the Board on reasonable notice that the parents" will sue). Consequently, the
court stated that "[a]bsent initiation of review proceedings [under the IDEA]
within a reasonable time of a unilateral decision to transfer a child to a private
institution, a school district would not know to continue to review and revise an
IEP." Id. at 158. Moreover, according to the court, the parents were fully aware
that their right to have their child's IEP reviewed "contain [ed] a corresponding
parental duty to unequivocally place in issue the appropriateness of an IEP." Id.
Therefore, the court concluded that waiting more than two years to seek reim-
bursement, without a mitigating excuse, was an "unreasonable delay" on the part
of the parents. Id. Thus, the court vacated the district court's award of retroactive
tuition reimbursement for these two years. See id. at 158-59 (denying parents reim-
bursement for two years of school). The court affirmed, however, retroactive tui-
tion reimbursement for the third year because there was no unreasonable delay as
to that year. See id. at 160 (stating that 'J.H.'s parents adequately placed in issue
their dissatisfaction with J.H.'s IEP for purposes of reimbursement" for third
school year).
133. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 868 (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement
when school district failed to financially maintain pendent placement that was
held to be appropriate placement); Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 151 (awarding retroac-
tive tuition reimbursement when parents had unilaterally placed child in private
boarding school that was held to be appropriate placement and when school dis-
trict's placement was determined to be inappropriate); Diamond, 808 F.2d at 992-
93 (affirming award of retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents unilater-
ally placed child in private residential setting that was held to be appropriate edu-
cational environment); Grymes, 672 F.2d at 323 (awarding retroactive tuition
reimbursement because of school district's failure to financially maintain appropri-
ate pendent placement).
134. See Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 151 (awarding retroactive tuition reimburse-
ment when parents unilaterally placed child in private boarding school that was
held to be appropriate placement, while school district's placement was found to
be inappropriate); Diamond, 808 F.2d at 992-93 (affirming award of retroactive tui-
tion reimbursement when parents unilaterally placed child in what was held to be
appropriate educational setting).
135. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865 (stating that implicit in stay put provision is
school district's continued financial responsibility for then current educational
placement); see also Grymes, 672 F.2d at 323 (awarding retroactive tuition reim-
bursement for school district's failure to financially maintain appropriate pendent
placement).
136. See Grymes, 672 F.2d at 323 (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement
when school district withdrew funds for pendent placement and stating that "con-
tinued funding [was] required until due process proceedings and appeals [had]
been completed"); see also Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (awarding retroactive tuition re-
imbursement for school district's failure to maintain pendent placement).
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parents and state may agree under section 1415(e) (3) (A) to a placement
other than the one functioning when the dispute occurs. 137 According to
the Supreme Court in Burlington, such an agreement occurs when an edu-
cational appeals panel finds that the IEP was inappropriate.1 3 8 If this oc-
curs, as the Susquenita court held, a new pendent placement is established
and the school district is required to maintain it pending the outcome of
litigation.' 3 9 Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Clovis Unified School District v. Calfornia Office of Administrative
Hearings,140 held that the financial obligation to maintain a pendent place-
ment is absolute. 14 ' Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit, school districts may
not recover tuition payments even if the public school placement is ulti-
mately held to have been the appropriate one. 142 In awarding prospective
tuition reimbursement for new pendent placements, the Susquenita court,
however, declined to decide whether school districts may recover these
funds.143
In awarding relief under the IDEA, the Third Circuit places great em-
phasis on the parents' financial ability to "front the costs" of their child's
FAPE. 14 4 Just as the Supreme Court in Burlington balanced equitable con-
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (1994) (providing that child shall remain
in pendent placement "unless the State or local education agency and the parents
... otherwise agree"); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (stating that decision by
state educational appeals panel constitutes agreement to pendent placement
within meaning of section 1415(e)(3) (A)); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96
F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that state education appeals panel's agreement
with parents' unilateral placement created new pendent placement within mean-
ing of section 1415(e)(3)(A)). For the complete language of section
1415(e) (3) (A), see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
138. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (stating that decision by state educational
appeals panel constitutes an agreement to pendent placement within meaning of
section 1415(e) (3) (A)); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83-84 (reiterating Supreme Court's
language in Burlington that educational appeals panel "'decision in favor of the
[parents] and the [private school] placements would seem to constitute agree-
ment by the state to the change of placement.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372)). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's
decision in Burlington, see supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
139. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84 (holding that state education appeals panel
constituted an agreement within meaning of section 1415(e) (3) (A) to create new
pendent placement and school district was financially responsible for that place-
ment). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Susquenita, see
infra notes 155-228 and accompanying text.
140. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 641 ("Burlington concluded that the school was required to main-
tain that placement pending the court review proceedings. ... We reach the same
conclusion here.").
142. See id. (holding school district financially responsible for pendent place-
ment regardless of which party ultimately prevailed on appeal).
143. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (acknowledging Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Clovis, but finding that issue of whether school district would be entitled to
repayment if they ultimately prevailed in case was "premature").
144. See id. at 86-87 (stating that right and access of child with disability to
FAPE is not assured by requiring parents to "front the funds for continued private
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siderations in determining that retroactive tuition reimbursement should
be available under the IDEA, so too has the Third Circuit in awarding
remedies under the IDEA.
1 45
The Third Circuit and other circuit courts have also interpreted Bur-
lington to permit the remedy of compensatory education. 146 Compensa-
tory education is a remedy under the IDEA "designed to provide remedial
educational programming to make up for the time when the school system
was responsible for providing educational services but failed to do so."
1 4 7
The Third Circuit in Lester H. v. Gilhool'48 reasoned that in awarding com-
pensatory education to a child who was deprived of his right to a FAPE,
education" and noting substantial burden on parents if they were forced to do so);
M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir.) (noting that Congress
did not intend child's entitlement to FAPE to "'turn upon ... parent's ability to
'front' its costs'" (quoting Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986))),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 176 (1996); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520,
536 (3d Cir. 1995) (awarding compensatory education when child had been de-
nied FAPE because child's access to FAPE should not depend on his or her parents
ability to "'front' the costs" and citing Miener, 800 F.2d at 753), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1419 (1996)); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating
in case for compensatory education that school districts "'should [not] escape lia-
bility for [educational] services simply because [the parent] was unable to provide
them in the first instance"' (alteration in original) (quoting Miener, 800 F.2d at
753)).
145. See, e.g., Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 85-87 (relying upon and discussing equita-
ble concerns of Supreme Court in Burlington in awarding prospective tuition reim-
bursement, such as parents financial ability to bear burden of private special
education); M.C., 81 F.3d at 395 (awarding compensatory education because
child's fight to FAPE should not hinge on parents' financial ability to "'front"'
costs); Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 536-37 (stating that compensatory education remedy is
intended to cure deprivation of child's right to FAPE and characterizing Supreme
Court's finding in Burlington as allowing equitable remedies when child's rights
have been violated); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir.
1994) (denying retroactive tuition reimbursement because parents failed to give
school district reasonable notice of claim by waiting more than two years to seek
reimbursement); Lester H., 916 F.2d at 873 (concluding that Congress empowered
courts to award compensatory education under IDEA and stating Congress "did
not intend to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an alternative
private education").
146. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 395 (ordering award remedy of compensatory educa-
tion and noting further that federal courts began awarding compensatory educa-
tion following Supreme Court's award of retroactive tuition reimbursement in
Burlington); Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 536-37 (same); Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872 (same).
147. GUERNSEY & Kt.Li, supra note 1, at 191; see DATA RESEARCH, INC., supra
note 54, at 177 (stating compensatory education is "[t]he belated provision of nec-
essary educational services by a school district to a student with a disability... [who
has] been deprived of [his or her] right to a [FAPE]"); OSBORNE, supra note 1, at
183 (stating compensatory education is awarded when school district did not pro-
vide child with FAPE and such compensatory services "are provided during a time
period when the student would not be otherwise eligible for services"); THOMAS &
Russo, supra note 1, at 65-66 (discussing award of compensatory education when
school district failed to provide eligible child with FAPE).
148. 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the court was providing a remedy for the deprivation of a right.149 Fur-
ther, if compensatory education was not an available remedy, the court
would be allowing the school district to escape liability simply because the
parent could not afford the appropriate placement during the pendency
of litigation.150 In other words, compensatory education is a remedy avail-
able when the parents are unable to "front the costs" of the appropriate
placement.1 51 Thus, the Third Circuit noted that remedies under section
1415(e) (3) (A) should be in accord with congressional intent.1 52 Regard-
ing that intent, the Lester H. court concluded that
Congress empowered the courts to grant a compensatory rem-
edy. Furthermore, we conclude that Congress, by allowing the
courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to cure the deprivation
of a child's right to a free appropriate public education, did not
intend to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an
alternative private education. 153
It is out of this concern for the parental ability to "front the costs" and
from the policies laid down in Burlington that the Susquenita court ex-
tended the remedies under section 1415(e) (3) (A) to include prospective
tuition reimbursement.1 5 4
IV: ANALYSIS: SSqrUENIA SCHOOL DSTRICT V. 1EI- S.: NEW
PENDENT PLACEMENTS AND RETROACTIVE VERSUS PROSPECTIVE
TUITION REIMBURSEMENT IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
ANOTHER VICTORY FOR PARENTS
A. The Issue, Facts and Procedural Posture
In the summer of 1994, shortly before Raelee S., a ninth grader with a
learning disability, was to enter Susquenita High School, the Susquenita
School District sent a Notice of Recommended Assignment ("NORA") and
149. Id. at 872-73 ("[C]ompensatory education ... cures the deprivation of a
handicapped child's statutory rights, thus providing a remedy which Congress in-
tended to make available.").
150. See id. (stating that rationale for awarding compensatory education is to
ensure child receives FAPE, and therefore, "[s]chool [d]istrict 'should [not] es-
cape liability for [educational] services simply because [the parent] was unable to
provide them in the first instance'" (alteration in original) (quoting Miener v.
Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986))).
151. See id. at 873 (noting that child's fight to FAPE should not depend on
parents' ability to "front" costs of private placement and later pursue retroactive
tuition reimbursement).
152. See id. at 873 (stating that in IDEA, Congress empowered courts to grant
remedy of compensatory education).
153. Id.
154. See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 1996)(awarding prospective tuition reimbursement because child's right to FAPE would
not be advanced by requiring his or her parents to front costs for private education
and discussing financial hardship that would be imposed on families if they were
required to front costs).
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a proposed IEP to her parents. 155 Soon after Raelee began high school,
her parents rejected the NORA and the proposed IEP.156 Thereafter, the
parents withdrew Raelee from Susquenita High School and unilaterally
placed her in a private school for students with learning disabilities.
157
Raelee's parents then invoked their right to a due process hearing under
section. 1415(b) (2) to determine the appropriateness of the private school
,placement and whether they were entitled to tuition reimbursement. 158
. In April 1995, the hearing officer found the proposed IEP to be ap-
propriate and held that the school district should not be financially re-
sponsible for the parents' unilateral decision to place Raelee in a private
school. 159 The parents appealed the decision to the state special educa-
tion appeals panel and won. 160 The appeals panel reversed the hearing
officer's decision and found that the proposed IEP was inappropriate. 6 1
Finding that the parents' private placement was the appropriate one, the
appeals panel held that Raelee's parents were entitled to tuition reim-
bursement.' 62 More important, however, the appeals panel established
the private school as Raelee's pendent placement for future disputes be-
tween the parties. 163 Under section 1415(e)(2), the school district ap-
155. See id. at 79 (noting that Raelee S. was child with learning disability
within meaning of IDEA).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. Pennsylvania has a two-tiered administrative review process under
the IDEA. See Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 863 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996)
(explaining Pennsylvania's special education hearing system). The first tier re-
quires an evidentiary hearing at the local level by a single impartial hearing officer.
See id. (denoting "local" and "state" levels as distiction between tiers) (citing 22 PA.
CODE § 14.64(m) (1994)). Either party may then appeal the hearing officer's deci-
sion to the state level before a panel of three impartial appellate officers. See id.
(noting system conforms to requirements of sections 1415(b) (2) and (c) of IDEA)
(citing 22 PA. CODE § 14.64(m)).
159. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 79.
160. See id.
161. See id. (noting that appeals panel found that school district's proposed
IEP was deficient in many respects and that it was not "'reasonably calculated to
provide, for -meaningful education benefit."' (quoting Special Education Opinion
No. 672, Typescript at 13)). The unilateral private school placement, although a
more restrictive placement, was nevertheless dedicated to the education of chil-
dren with learning disabilities. See id. (discussing reasoning of appeals panel).
Consequently, the appeals panel held that "Raelee's current [educational] needs
... outweigh[ed] her need for integration with nondisabled peers." Id. (quoting
Special Education Opinion No. 672, Typescript at 13).
162. See id. at 79-80 (stating that under IDEA, parents have right to withdraw
their child from public school unilaterally, place him or her in private school and
receive tuition reimbursement when school district fails to offer child FAPE).
163. See id. (holding that "'unless this order is overturned in a Common-
wealth or federal district court, the private school placement shall be the pendent
placement in any future disputes between the parent and the District."' (quoting
Special Education Opinion No. 672, Typescript at 6)). The appeals panel's lan-
guage is based on section 1415(e) (3) (A), which provides that during the pendency
of any proceedings under section 1415 (e) (3) (A), a child shall remain in his or her
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pealed the decision of the special education appeals panel by filing a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.
164
In the complaint, the school district claimed that the special educa-
tion appeals panel had incorrectly identified the private school as Raelee's
pendent placement and awarded tuition reimbursement. 165 Additionally,
the school district asked the district court to stay the special education
appeals panel decision "insofar as it direct[ed the school district] to reim-
burse the parents for expenses and ... state[d] that Raelee's placement
within the meaning of ... § 1415(e) (3) [(A)] (was] a private school."166
The district court denied the motion for stay. 1 6 7 Further, the district
court held that Raelee's pendent placement during the pendency of the
appeal would be the private school until further order from the court
otherwise.' 68 Thus, the district court's holding effectively required the
"then current educational placement" unless "the State or local educational
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A)
(1994); see also Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 80 n.1 (discussing section 1415(e) (3) (A)). In
Burlington, the Supreme Court stated that a decision of an appeals panel can con-
stitute an agreement within the meaning of section 1415(e) (3) (A). School Comm.
of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985).
164. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 80 (noting that school district filed "Complaint
in the Nature of an Appeal from the decision of the special education appeals
panel" and that district court's jurisdiction was based on section 1415(e)(2)).
Section 1415(e) (2) provides that:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision [by a State educational
agency] under subsection (c) of this section, shall have the right to bring
a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this
section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to
the amount in controversy.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2).
165. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 80 (noting that School District alleged further
that appeals panel had improperly disregarded hearing officer's credibility deter-
minations and made findings of fact unsupported by record). For purposes of
appeal to the Third Circuit, however, the school district's allegations regarding
placement and tuition reimbursement are the most important. See id. (stating that
"most importantly for purposes of this appeal," school district alleged that appeals
panel "erred when it identified the private school as Raelee's pendent placement
and awarded tuition reimbursement").
166. Id. The motion for a stay was filed pursuant to Rules 62(d) and (f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (noting school district's request that dis-
trict court grant motion for stay pending appeal).
167. See id. at 81.
168. See id. In evaluating the motion for a stay, the district court held that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) requires an analysis similar to one employed
for preliminary injunctions. See id. at 80 (discussing preliminary injunction analy-
sis). The analysis requires four factors to be considered: "1) the movant's likeli-
hood of success on the merits; 2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm
if the request is denied; 3) whether third parties will be harmed by the stay; and 4)
whether granting the stay will serve the public interest." Id. As to the first factor,
the district court noted that success on the merits of the case was difficult to pre-
dict, but concluded, based "on the then current state of the record .... the likeli-
hood of success favors Raelee S." Id. On the public interest factor, the district
1900 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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school district to reimburse the parents for past private school tuition ex-
penses and to maintain the pendent placement by prospectively paying
the tuition. 169 The school district then appealed the denial of the stay to
the Third Circuit.' 70 Specifically, the school district asked the Third Cir-
cuit to decide if the school district was financially responsible for the costs
of the learning disabled child's private schooling pending the outcome of
litigation establishing the propriety of that placement. 17 1
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis of Pendent Placements and Financial
Responsibility
In Susquenita, the parties asked the Third Circuit to decide the appro-
priate pendent placement for Raelee, the party financially responsible for
court again noted that the state of the record made assessment difficult. See id.
(finding nevertheless, that public interest factor favored Raelee's receiving FAPE
and that if district court was compelled to make assessment at that juncture, court
would find for Raelee). Next, the district court evaluated the argument that the
school district would suffer irreparable harm if it had to pay for the private place-
ment. See id. at 80-81 (noting additionally that under current case law, even if
school district ultimately prevailed on appeal, it would not be entitled to recover
funds for Raelee's private school); see also Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California
Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990) (awarding prospec-
tive tuition reimbursement and finding that parents would not be required to re-
pay those funds even if school district ultimately prevailed in suit). Although the
court acknowledged the risk of irreparable harm, it ultimately found that the pros-
pect of harm was not sufficient grounds on which to grant the stay. See Susquenita,
96 F.3d at 81 (stating that although there was merit to school district's claim of
harm, it was insufficient to justify granting of motion for stay pending appeal).
Finally, as to the third factor, the district court held that third parties would not be
harmed if the stay was denied. See id. at 80 (concluding that third parties-stu-
dents-would not be harmed by denial of stay). On the issue, the district court
stated that
"[t]he only harm which we can conceive of is the financial burden which
will be borne by the district during the pendency of this appeal. We have
nothing before us to suggest that other students will be denied a proper
or adequate education if the order compelling the district to fund
[Raelee's] private school remains in effect during the pendency of this
appeal."
Id. at 80 (quoting Special Education Opinion No. 672, Typescript at 4).
169. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 81 & n.3 (noting that district court holding
effectively decided reimbursement issue in favor of parents). The district court's
order denying the stay required the school district to reimburse Raelee's parents
for the tuition incurred during the 1994-1995 academic year. See id. at 81 n.3 (stat-
ing that order also effectively made school district financially responsible for con-
tinuing private school placement as well). Moreover, the district court's
affirmation of the special education appeals panel order established the private
school as the pendent placement and made the school district "financially respon-
sible for continuing the private school placement ... [and] thus decided both reim-
bursement for and prospective payment of private school tuition." Id. (emphasis
added).
170. See id. at 79.
171. See id. at 78.
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that placement and when that.party must pay for the placement. 172 The
school district argued that the private school placement was not the pen-
dent placement. 173 Moreover, the school district contended that even if
the appeals panel had correctly decided that the private school was the
pendent placement, financial responsibility therefore could not be im-
posed until the end of the appellate process, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington.174 Because the issues of pendent place-
ment and financial responsibility are linked, the Third Circuit first ad-
dressed these issues and then turned to the school district's interpretation
of Burlington.]75
1. Pendent Placement and Financial Responsibility
Section 1415(e) of the IDEA details the procedural safeguards that
are designed to guarantee parents the opportunity to participate in all
decisions affecting their child's education. 176 When a school district plans
to change a child's established educational program, the IDEA requires it
to provide parents with written notice of the proposed change.' 77 If par-
ents object to a change in their child's placement, however, parents may
invoke section 1415(e) (3) (A) to ensure that the child remains in his or
172. See id. at 81 (noting that appeal involved three practical questions: (1)
where Raelee should attend school pending litigation; (2) who must pay for
Raelee's placement; and (3) when payment must be made).
173. See id. (noting school district's argument that it was not financially
responsible).
174. See id. at 81, 84 (acknowledging that "issues of pendent placement and
financial responsibility are linked").
175. See id. (stating that pendent placement and financial responsibility are
linked and addressing timing of financial responsibility in light of Burlington).
176. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1994) (listing parents' appeals rights when
school district seeks to change child's placement); see also Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82
(stating that "[t]hese safeguards are meant to 'guarantee parents both an opportu-
nity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and
the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate"' (quoting
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988))). Additionally, section 1415(e) allows
parents to seek a review of any decisions regarding their child's education that the
parents feel is inappropriate. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (authorizing parents to ap-
peal decisions); Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82 (explaining section 1415(e)). The court
further noted that Congress "'repeatedly emphasized throughout the [IDEA] the
importance of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any
subsequent assessments of its effectiveness."' Id. (quoting Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-
12) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b) (1) (A), (C), (D), (E),
1415(b) (2)).
177. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (C) (requiring written notice to parents when
school system either proposes or refuses to change child's educational program);
see also Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82 (noting IDEA requires "written notice of any pro-
posed changes in the child's established educational program" (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b) (1) (C))). Moreover, section 1415(e) (2) authorizes parents to seek an ad-
ministrative review of such changes and may appeal any adverse decision to state or
federal court. See id. (listing dissatisfied parents' appeal options) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e) (2)).
1902
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 5 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss5/5
1997] CASEBRIEF 1903
her then current educational placement during the course of administra-
tive and judicial proceedings. 178
Although the stay put provision is usually invoked by parents to pre-
vent a change in placement, the Third Circuit noted that this was not the
case in Susquenita.179 In Susquenita, the parents disagreed with the pro-
posed IEP in the public school and unilaterally placed their child in a
private school instead.180 Consequently, the Third Circuit stated that be-
cause the parents chose not to invoke the stay put provision, the provision
was inoperative when the parents changed Raelee's placement.1 8 1
178. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82 (stating that section 1415(e) (3) (A) is known
as IDEA's pendent placement or stay put provision and discussing its role as proce-
dural safeguard). A state's compliance with the IDEA is monitored by federal re-
view and assured by the IDEA's procedural safeguards extended to parents and
their children. See id. (listing compliance mechanisms) (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.61,
100.7 (1997)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)-(f) (setting forth procedural
safeguards).
Moreover, section 1415(e) (3) (A) has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as having a protective purpose. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 82-83 (stating protection
benefits parents and child) (citing Honig, 484 U.S. at 323; School Comm. of Bur-
lington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 361 (1985)). The protective pur-
pose was to strip school districts of the unilateral power they traditionally had to
exclude children with disabilities from school. See id. at 82 (stating school districts
could exclude children with disabilities over their parents' objections) (citing
Honig, 484 U.S. at 324); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (stating Congress's con-
cern about apparent widespread practice of excluding children with disabilities
from public schools or warehousing them in private institutions and special
classes); Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1996) (recog-
nizing that policy concerns underlying section 1415(e) (3) (A) demonstrate Con-
gress's "choice that all handicapped children, regardless of whether their case is
meritorious or not, are to remain in their current educational placement until the
dispute with regard to their placement is ultimately resolved" (citing Woods v. New
Jersey Dep't of Educ., 20 Indivs. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 439,
440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1993))).
179. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83 (noting stay put provision is often invoked by
parents in order to maintain placements when parents disagree with the school
district's proposed change in placement). To ascertain what the current place-
ment is for purposes of the stay put provision, the Third Circuit has held that the
"dispositive factor" is the child's current educational placement at the time the stay
put provision is invoked. Id. (citing Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867).
180. Id. at 79.
181. See id. at 83 (noting that Raelee's parents had decided that public school
IEP was inadequate, they chose not to invoke protections of section 1415(e) (3) (A)
and instead decided to place her in private school at their own expense). The
Susquenita court reasoned that because Raelee's parents made a unilateral change
in placement before they sought administrative review, the stay put provision was
inoperative. See id. (finding this case differs from many where pendent placement
is at issue).
At the time Raelee's parents transferred her to private school, the public
school would have been the pendent placement under section 1415(e) (3) (A) of
the IDEA. See id. (stating that school district argued that because last functioning
IEP was in public school system, it must remain Raelee's pendent placement). The
parents did not dispute this point, but instead argued that a new pendent place-
ment, and the financial responsibility therefor, was created by the education ap-
peals panel decision in their favor. See id. (agreeing with parents' argument).
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The parents, however, contended that the education appeals panel
decision designating the private school as Raelee's pendent placement
had created a new pendent placement from that point forward.18 2 Ac-
cording to the parents, this new pendent placement was the private
school.18 3 The school district, on the other hand, argued that a pendent
placement under section 1415(e) (3) (A) is fixed for the duration of the
proceedings and cannot be changed. 184 Therefore, according to the
school district, because the public school was the pendent placement at
the commencement of the administrative proceedings, it remained the
pendent placement throughout.1 8 5 The Third Circuit disagreed with the
school district based on the language of section 1415(e)(3)(A) of the
IDEA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that language in
Burlington. 18 6
Beginning with section 1415(e) (3) (A), the Third Circuit noted that
the language requires a child to remain in his or her pendent placement
"'unless the state or local educational agency and the parents or guardian
otherwise agree."'187 Next, the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of this language in Burlington.'8 The Third Circuit
182. See id. (stating that parents contended that appeals panel decision al-
tered pendent placement and financial responsibility landscape). The education
appeals panel held that the school district's proposed IEP was inadequate and that
the private school placement was the appropriate placement for Raelee. See id.
More importantly, the panel directed that the private school be the pendent place-
ment "in any future disputes 'unless the [panel] order is overturned in a Common-
wealth or federal district court.'" Id. (quoting Special Education Opinion No. 672,
Typescript at 14 n.27).
183. See id. (noting that "the parents argue [d] that a new pendent was created
and that, from the time of the panel decision forward, Susquenita [was] ... re-
quired to bear the financial burden of maintaining Raelee at the private school").
184. See id. at 84 (noting school district's contention that "a pendent place-
ment that is appropriate at the outset of administrative proceedings is fixed for the
duration of the proceedings and cannot be altered by an administrative ruling in
the parents' favor").
185. See id. at 84 & n.6 (discussing school district's argument that pendent
placement is fixed at outset of administrative proceedings and school district's mis-
placed reliance on Drinker).
186. See id. at 84 (noting parents' position was derived from language of IDEA
and to adopt school district's argument would "contravene the language of the
statute and the holding of Burlington").
187. Id. at 83 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (A) (1994)). Thus, in the eyes
of the Susquenita court, the parents' argument regarding the creation of a new
pendent placement by the appeals panel was derived directly from the language of
the IDEA itself. See id. at 84 (citing- Burlington as additional authority for parents'
position).
188. See id. (analyzing and applying Burlington Court's interpretation of stat-
ute). Judge Becker, concurring in the result, would have relied solely on the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Burlington that an agreement by a state appeals
panel constitutes an agreement for purposes of section 1415(e) (3) (A). See id. at 84
n.5. Consequently, Judge Becker would have imposed financial responsibility for
Raelee's pendent placement on the school district because the state education ap-
peals panel had agreed to the pendent placement in accordance with section
1415(e) (3). See id. ('Judge Becker would rest the decision ... on the block quote
1904
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stated that the Burlington Court established that "a ruling by the education
appeals panel in favor of the parents' position constitutes agreement for
purposes of section 1415(e)(3)[(A)]." 8 9 Therefore, the Third Circuit
held that the education appeals panel decision created a new pendent
placement by agreement under section 1415(e) (3) (A).' 90
In addressing the school district's position on pendent placements,
the Third Circuit again relied on Burlington as well as the statutory lan-
guage of the IDEA. 191 The court rejected the school district's argument
that pendent placements are fixed for the duration of the dispute and may
not be altered. 19 2 Rather, the Third Circuit held that to accept such an
argument would contravene the statutory language and the holding of
Burlington.19
3
The Third Circuit also rejected the school district's reliance on the
Third Circuit's decision in Drinker.19 4 The court stated that Drinker was
distinguishable because: (1) the parents in that case had invoked the stay
put provision to maintain the current placement that the school district
had proposed to change and (2) there had been no agreement on the
pendent placement.19 5 In Drinker, the Third Circuit held that a child's
"then current educational placement" under section 1415(e) (3) (A) is de-
from Burlington in which the Court suggested that a decision by an appellate panel
in favor of the parents constitutes agreement by the state for purposes of
§ 1415(e) (3) [(A)].").
189. Id. at 83. The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of section 1415(e) (3) (A) in Burlington where the Court stated that
[a]s an initial matter, we note that... [§ 1415(e) (3) (A)] calls for agree-
ment by either the State or the local educational agency. The [Bureau of Spe-
cial Education Appeal's] decision in favor of the [parents] and the
[private] [s]chool placement would seem to constitute an agreement by
the State to the change of placement.
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985)
(emphasis added).
190. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83 (stating that, from point of educational ap-
peals panel decision forward, Raelee's pendent placement was private school as
created by agreement of state).
191. See id. (stating that school district's argument is contrary to language of
statute and Supreme Court's holding in Burlington).
192. See id. at 84 (noting school district argued that pendent placement that is
appropriate at outset of review proceedings is fixed and cannot be changed by
administrative decision finding parents' placement appropriate).
193. See id. (stating that school district's position would render appeals panel
decision "of no practical significance unless and until it is affirmed by a decision
that cannot be or is not appealed").
194. See id. at 84 n.6. (stating that school district's reliance on Drinker is mis-
placed). Judge Becker, concurring in the result, also believed the school district's
reliance on Drinker to be misplaced, but for different reasons than the majority. See
id. (Becker, J., concurring) (noting Judge Becker's differing reasoning). He be-
lieved that Drinker "related not to the appropriate placement, but to the timing of
the placement and [that] timing [was] not an issue here." Id. (Becker, J.,
concurring).
195. See id. (detailing factual distinctions between Drinker and Susquenita).
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termined by reference to the then functioning IEP. 196 Moreover, the
Drinker court held that the pendent placement could not be changed
pending the resolution of the litigation, at least at the district court
level.1 97 The Third Circuit in Susquenita, however, held that Drinker could
not be interpreted to negate a state education appeals panel's decision
establishing an appropriate pendent placement. 198 The Third Circuit
stated that section 1415(e) (3) (A) was enacted to protect the interests of
their children and parents' 99 Therefore, the court concluded that sec-
tion 1415(e) (3) (A) could "not be used. . . as a weapon by the Susquenita
school district" to force parents to leave their child in placement that an
educational panel has determined to be inappropriate. 20
0
Having established that Raelee's new pendent placement was the pri-
vate school and that this placement was created by state agreement, the
Third Circuit turned to the financial responsibility for that placement.20 1
The court held that once a state agreed to a pendent placement, a school
district's financial responsibility for that placement follows. 20 2 Therefore,
the court concluded that because the state had agreed to the new pendent
placement in the private school, the school district was obligated to pay for
the pendent placement.20 3 The Third Circuit's task was not yet complete,
however, because the school district argued that the imposition of pro-
spective tuition reimbursement or reimbursement "pendente lite" was
barred by the Supreme Court's holding in Burlington.204 The school dis-
trict contended that Burlington permits only retroactive tuition reimburse-
196. Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 (3d Cir. 1996). The
Drinker court stated that "'the dispositive factor in deciding a child's "current edu-
cational placement" should be the ... IEP... actually functioning when the "stay
put" [provision] is invoked."' Id. (quoting Woods v. NewJersey Dep't of Educ., 20
Indivs. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17,
1993)); see Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84 n.6 (noting that Third Circuit in Drinker held
that "child's pendent placement should be determined with reference to the last
functioning IEP").
197. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (holding "that a child should remain in that place-
ment pending resolution of the litigation at least at the district court level"); see also
Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 78, 84 n.6 (discussing Drinker holding).
198. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 84 n.6 (stating that such interpretation of
Drinker is too broad).
199. See id. at 84 ("[Section] 1415(e) (3) (A) was drafted to guard the interests
of parents and their children.").
200. See id. ("We cannot agree that this same section should be used here as a
weapon by the Susquenita School District to force parents to maintain a child in a
public school placement which the state appeals panel has held inappropriate.").
201. See id. (analyzing financial responsibility for new pendent placements
"pendente lite").
202. See id. ("It is undisputed that once there is state agreement with respect
to pendent placement, afortiori, financial responsibility on the part of the local
school district follows.").
203. See id. (stating that "from point of the panel decision forward . . .
Raelee's pendent placement, by agreement of the state, is the private school and
[the school district] . . . is obligated to pay for that placement").
204. See id. (addressing argument raised by school district).
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ment after the appropriateness of a placement is conclusively
established. 2
05
2. Tuition Reimbursement for New Pendent Placements Under the IDEA:
When Does Financial Responsibility Begin?
Just as equitable concerns weighed heavily in the Supreme Court's
decision in Burlington to make retroactive tuition reimbursement a remedy
available under section 1415(e) (3) (A) of the IDEA, these same considera-
tions formed the basis for the Third Circuit's recognition of prospective
tuition reimbursement in Susquenita.20 6 In Susquenita, the school district
contended that because the parents unilaterally placed Raelee in a private
school, they bore the financial burden to pay for that placement until a
court conclusively established its appropriateness. 20 7 In response, the
Third Circuit noted that because the procedural context of Burlington
made retroactive tuition reimbursement appropriate, it was not control-
ling precedent on the issue of prospective tuition reimbursement.20 8 Nev-
ertheless, the Third Circuit found that the concerns underlying the
decision in Burlington, as well as the Court's analysis therein, applied with
equal force to claims for tuition payments due during the pendency of
litigation or, in other words, to prospective tuition reimbursement
claims. 20 9 Accordingly, the Susquenita court relied on these policy con-
cerns in extending the rationale of Burlington to claims for prospective
tuition reimbursement.2 10 These concerns focused on (1) the lengthy du-
ration of IDEA litigation; (2) the IDEA's mandate to provide children with
205. See id. (declining to adopt school district's "restrictive reading" of
Burlington).
206. Id. at 84-85 (stating that Burlington dealt with retroactive tuition reim-
bursement and, thus, was not binding precedent on court in case at hand). Never-
theless, the Susquenita court reasoned that the concerns underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington were equally applicable to tuition payments made
during the pendency of the litigation. Id. at 84 (concluding that Supreme Court's
analysis should not be confined to retroactive tuition reimbursement cases, but
should also apply to claims for prospective tuition reimbursement like those in
Susquenita).
207. See id. (noting that school district based its argument on Supreme
Court's holding in Burlington). The school district argued that Burlington "man-
date[d] that prospective tuition reimbursement or reimbursement 'pendente lite'
be barred under the IDEA; without exception." Id.
208. See id. (stating that because Burlington arose in context that made discus-
sion of retroactive reimbursement appropriate, its holding was not controlling in
Susquenita).
209. See id. at 84-85 (recognizing similar concerns underlying claims for retro-
active and prospective tuition reimbursement and stating that "the analysis em-
ployed by the Supreme Court [in Burlington is] useful in resolving the issue now
before us").
210. See id. (reiterating Supreme Court's analysis and holding in Burlington).
The court noted that under Burlington, section 1415(e) (2) permits courts to order
school districts to retroactively reimburse parents for private school tuition "where
the court ultimately determines that private, rather than public, education under a
proposed IEP is appropriate." Id. at 85.
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a FAPE; and (3) the parents' right to fully participate in the development
of their child's IEP.2 11 Concluding that these concerns also exist in claims
for prospective tuition reimbursement, the Third Circuit held that they
"favor including the interim assessment of financial responsibility in the
range of relief available under the IDEA." 212
Next, the Third Circuit applied the policy concerns underlying retro-
active tuition reimbursement to the facts in Susquenita.213 Parents, such as
Raelee's, who disagree with a proposed IEP for their child must choose
211. See id. at 81 n.4, 85 (noting that when merits of Raelee's case eventually
reach Third Circuit on appeal, Raelee may have spent years in what may be deter-
mined to have been inappropriate educational setting either because appropriate
placement was misidentified or her parents were unable to pay for appropriate
one). Thus, the court relied on the language of Burlington that:
"A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances
come a year or more after the school term covered by the IEP has passed.
In the meantime, the parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are
faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child
if it turns out to be inappropriate or to pay for what they consider to be
the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course . . . it would
be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they
were fight but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be re-
imbursed .... If that were the case, the child's right to a free appropriate
public education, the parents' right to participate fully in developing a
proper IEP and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than
complete."
Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting School Comm. of Burlington v. Depart-
ment of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)). Additionally, the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged that if retroactive tuition reimbursement were not an available remedy
under the IDEA, parents would be "'forced to leave the child in what may turn out
to be an inappropriate educational placement."' Id. (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S.
at 372).
212. Id. at 86. The legislative history of the IDEA also convinced the court
that Congress did not intend to shield school districts from financial responsibility
prior to the close of litigation. See id. at 85 (stating that neither IDEA nor its legis-
lative history evidences congressional intent to "shield school districts from finan-
cial responsibility prior to the close of litigation"). Rather, the Third Circuit
concluded that "[t]he IDEA was enacted to guarantee handicapped children a free
and appropriate education and its legislative history is devoid of any indication
that Congress intended to limit the timing of a school district's financial obliga-
tions in accordance with some pre-determined formula." Id. at 85-86. Moreover,
the legislative history itself requires financial disputes to be resolved through the
IDEA's administrative processes. See id. at 86 ("Resolution of financial disputes is
not governed by rigid rules but is, instead, committed to the administrative pro-
cess." (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 32 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1426)). The legislative history indicates that when parents are forced to place
their child in a private school at their own expense because an appropriate pro-
gram is not available in the public school, and the school district disagrees with
that placement, "'question of who remains financially responsible is a matter to
which the due process procedures . .. app[ly]."' Id. (alteration in original) (quot-
ing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 32 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1426).
213. See id. at 86-87 (stating purpose of IDEA is to ensure every child receive
FAPE).
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where to educate their child until the merits of their case are decided.214
Consequently, parents must choose either to continue their child's educa-
tion in what the parents believe to be an inappropriate placement or to
place their child in an educational placement they deem appropriate at
their own expense. 2 15 Such a choice, however, is real only for those par-
ents with the financial resources to pay for an alternative placement.216
Moreover, because the "'review process is ponderous"' and the cost of
private special education is substantial, families without adequate financial
resources would face an overwhelming financial burden if required to pay
for the alternative placement in the interim. 21 7 Additionally, when the
state, as here, has agreed to the alternate placement and thus created a
new pendent placement, prospective tuition reimbursement is crucial to
ensuring that the child receives a FAPE. 218 Therefore, the Third Circuit
concluded:
Without interim financial support, a parent's "choice" to have his
child remain in what the state has determined to be an appropri-
ate private school placement amounts to no choice at all. The pros-
pect of reimbursement at the end of the litigation turnpike is of little
consolation to a parent who cannot pay the toll at the outset.219
The Third Circuit in Susquenita was determined to give parents a
choice in cases in which a state educational appeals panel had created a
new pendent placement by agreement. 220 As such, the court held that
"[w]hile parents who reject a proposed IEP bear the initial expenses of a
unilateral placement, the school district's financial responsibility should
begin when there is an administrative or judicial decision vindicating the
parent's position." 221 Thus, the Third Circuit in Susquenita concluded
214. See id. at 86 (stating that here, and in many other cases, when parents
disagree with IEP proposed and wait for case to be addressed through administra-
tive and judicial review, they must make choice either to leave child in what they
believe is inappropriate placement or elect to pay for what they deem appropriate
one).
215. See id. (discussing parents' options when they disagree with proposed
IEP).
216. See id. (stating that such options are "real only for parents who have the
financial wherewithal to pay for alternate placement").
217. Id. at 87 (quoting School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ.,
471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)).
218. See id. at 86-87 (stating that purpose of IDEA is to ensure that every child
receives FAPE and concluding further that this is not advanced by requiring par-
ent, who succeeds in obtaining ruling that private school is appropriate placement,
to front costs for that private educational placement).
219. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
220. See id. (noting that without prospective tuition reimbursement, parents
would have no choice as to where to educate their child because review process is
ponderous and cost of private education would impose overwhelming financial
burden).
221. Id. at 86. Therefore according to the Susquenita court, prospective tui-
tion reimbursement is available whenever there has been a decision of an educa-
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that a school district "cannot avoid interim responsibility for funding what
the state has agreed is an appropriate pendent placement. 222
Cognizant of the financial burden this may place on school districts,
the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Florence.223
On the issue of retroactive tuition reimbursement, the Florence Court
stated that Congress undoubtedly had placed a significant financial bur-
den on states and school districts that participate in the IDEA. 224 None-
theless, the Third Circuit concluded that school districts must either
provide appropriate public education for each child with a disability or, in
the alternative, pay for a private one.225
Thus, in affirming the district court's denial for a stay of payment of
tuition, the Third Circuit placed immediate financial responsibility for
Raelee's private pendent placement on the school district and stated that
these payments may not be deferred until the outcome of litigation.2 26 In
the eyes of the court, the result was "distilled from the unambiguous lan-
guage of the IDEA, the Act's legislative history, and the case law interpret-
ing the Act."22 7 Nevertheless, although the Susquenita holding appears on
its face to be clear and simple, it actually leaves many questions unan-
swered about financial responsibility for pendent placements. 2
28
tional appeals panel or a court. See id. (awarding prospective tuition
reimbursement in instant case).
The Third Circuit in Susquenita did not decide, however, if a decision by a
hearing officer would also impose such financial responsibility. See id. at 85 n.8
(declining to address issue). Because the hearing officer ruled against the parents
in this case, the Third Circuit stated that the case "[did] not present and we do not
decide whether a decision of the hearing officer in favor of the parents would
constitute agreement by the state for purposes of pendent placement and tuition
reimbursement." Id.
222. Id. at 87.
223. See id. (adopting Florence language) (citing Florence County Sch. Dist.
Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)).
224. See id. (minding possible financial burden, but dismissing argument be-
cause school districts can avoid reimbursement claims by heeding Florence advice)
(citing Florence, 510 U.S. at 15).
225. See id. The court explained that:
"[P]ublic educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents
for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things:
give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or
place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice.
This is the IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform to it need
not worry about reimbursement claims."
Id. (quoting Florence, 510 U.S. at 15).
226. See id. (holding that school district was responsible to fund private school
placement and "financial obligations with respect to the pendent placement are
immediate and may not be deferred until the close of litigation").
227. Id.
228. Id. at 87 nA0 (stating that court would not address issue of whether
school district would be able to recover tuition payments from parents if school
district ultimately prevailed in dispute); see Terri Weintraub, SchoolDistrict Must Pay
Private School Tuition for Disabled Student During Dispute, 3rd Circuit Rules, WEsT's
LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 561172 (stating that case could
1910
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V. PRACTITIONER'S NOTES
The Third Circuit's decision in Susquenita marks the first time that the
court has required a school district to prospectively reimburse parents for
funds expended on a new pendent placement in a private school during
litigation. 22 9 Financial responsibility for pendent placements, however,
existed prior to the court's decision in Susquenita.2 30 Nevertheless, the
holding in Susquenita clarifies a school district's financial responsibility for
all pendent placements. Despite the clarity of the court's holding, the
Third Circuit's decision in Susquenita leaves two important questions unan-
swered.23 1 First, if parents are successful in winning a decision holding
have big financial impact on school districts). Naomi Gittens, staff attorney with
National School Boards Association's Council of School Attorneys, stated: "If you
look at the stay put provision, the child is supposed to stay put until the proceed-
ings are over .... What if the parents win at the hearing level? At what point do
you switch the [financial] responsibility?" Id.
229. Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (noting that court was aware of only one
other court of appeals that had decided case turning on creation of new pendent
placement). Despite the holding in Susquenita, the Third Circuit has long re-
quired school districts to financially maintain a pendent placement. See Drinker v.
Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Implict in the maintenance
of the status quo is the requirement that a school district continue to finance an
educational placement made by an agency and consented to by the parent.");
Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring school district to
maintain pendent placement until due process proceeding and appeals had been
completed).
230. See Drinker, 78 F.3d. at 864 (requiring school district to retroactiyely reim-
burse parents for failing to financially maintain pendent placement); Grymes, 672
F.2d at 323 (awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement when school district with-
drew funding for pendent placement and stating further that financial mainte-
nance of that placement is required until due process and appeals panel has been
completed).
231. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (stating that court would not address
whether school district would be entitled to reimbursement of funds expended on
tuition if they ultimately prevailed). Specifically, the Third Circuit expressly recog-
nized an earlier Ninth Circuit's holding that awarded prospective tuition reim-
bursement and imposed an absolute duty on the school district to fund the
pendent placement even if the district were to prevail on appeal. See Susquenita, 96
F.3d at 87 n.10 (citing Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin.
Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990)). Finding that to decide the issue would be
.premature," the Third Circuit stated that analysis of the issue was not necessary to
affirm the district court's denial of the stay. Id. The district court held that the
school district would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were denied and the school
district was liable for prospective tuition reimbursement in light of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Clovis. See id. at 80-81, 87 n.10 (stating district court found that
"under current case law, the [school district] would not be entitled to recover
funds expended to maintain Raelee in private school even if it were to prevail on
appeal. The court thus found merit in Susquenita's argument that it would suffer
irreparable harm if the stay were denied."). Nevertheless, the district court denied
the stay and concluded that all other relevant factors-such as likelihood of Raelee
succeeding on the merits, her right to receive a FAPE and lack of harm to third
parties if stay were denied-weighed in favor of denying the stay. See id. (citing
Special Education Opinion No. 672, Typescript at 4). Thus, the Third Circuit
noted that even if it was to find that the school district were entitled to reimburse-
ment if they ultimately prevailed, there would be no risk of irreparable harm and,
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their unilateral, private placement to be the appropriate placement and
that decision is later reversed by a district court, do the parents then reas-
sume financial responsibility for that placement?232 Second, if the school
district's placement is ultimately judged to be appropriate, must the par-
ents repay any funds expended by the school district for the parents' uni-
lateral placement?233
The answer to the first question is, as of yet, unknown. In light of the
policy of assuring the right of a child with a disability to a FAPE, it would
seem that the parents would probably not have to reassume financial re-
sponsibility.234 Because the courts have continually stated that a child's
right to a FAPE should not depend on his or her parents' financial ability
to "front the costs," it seems unlikely that courts would advocate shifting
the financial burden. 235 Such a shift could result in some parents being
therefore, the argument in favor of denying the stay would be even stronger. See
id. at 87 n.10 (noting that "argument in favor of denying the stay would be even
stronger" if court failed to find that school district's financial obligation was abso-
lute and that school district would suffer irreparable harm); see also Weintraub,
supra note 228 (noting that after Third Circuit's decision in Susquenita, it is unclear
if financial responsibility for pendent placement will shift back to parents if deci-
sions of special appeals panel or district court subsequently finds in favor of school
district's placement).
232. See Weintraub, supra note 228 (stating that it is unclear whether school
districts or parents will be financially responsible if parents ultimately lose in
court).
233. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (declining to resolve whether parents
must repay school district if school district ultimately prevails).
234. See id. at 87 (noting that child's right to FAPE is not advanced by requir-
ing parents to "front the funds" for private education). In awarding remedies for a
school district's failure to provide a FAPE to a child with a disability, the Third
Circuit has repeatedly held that a child's right to a FAPE should not hinge on his
or her parents' financial ability to "front" the costs of that education. See id. (not-
ing that without interim financial support for pendent placement parents would
face overwhelming financial burden in paying for private education during
lengthy litigation process); M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d
Cir.) (awarding compensatory education because child's right to FAPE should not
hinge on parents' financial ability to "front" costs), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 176
(1996); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1995)
(same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419 (1996); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873
(3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that Congress empowered courts to award compensa-
tory education under IDEA and stating Congress "did not intend to offer a remedy
only to those parents able to afford an alternative private education").
235. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 (stating that purpose of IDEA, which is to
ensure child receives FAPE, is not advanced by requiring parents to "front the
funds" for private education when they have succeeded in obtaining ruling that
school district's IEP is inappropriate); M.C., 81 F.3d at 395 (awarding compensa-
tory education because child's right to FAPE should not hinge on parents' finan-
cial ability to "front" costs); Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 536-37 (same); Lester H., 916 F.2d at
873 (concluding that Congress empowered courts to award compensatory educa-
tion under IDEA and stating that Congress "did not intend to offer a remedy only
to those parents able to afford an alternative private education"); see also Delaware
County Intermediate Unit No. 25 v. Martin K, 831 F. Supp. 1206, 1221 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (awarding prospective tuition reimbursement and holding that parents are
entitled to rely on ruling of state administrative body in favor of private place-
1912 [Vol. 42: p. 1867
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forced to withdraw their child from what may ultimately be held to be the
appropriate placement and, thus, would strip children of their right to a
FAPE. 236 Therefore, it is likely that courts will require school districts with
deeper pockets to continue funding the placement until the issue is ulti-
mately resolved. 237
As to the second unanswered question, the Third Circuit explicitly
withheld a decision on the issue of repayment.23 8 Although the Ninth
Circuit in Clovis held that parents will not be liable for repayment of such
funds, it is not clear if the Third Circuit will do the same. 23 9 Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Burlington mandated that when parents unilaterally
change their child's placement, they do it at their own financial risk.
240
Thus, if parents are not liable for repayment of such funds, in effect, they
ment). In Martin K., the district court relied on the First Circuit's decision in Bur-
lington and stated that
"where a state agency orders a town to fund a private placement, after
ruling against a town's IEP, parents will be placed in the difficult position
of having to choose between the state directive to maintain the child in
the private placement at the risk of ultimately using their own funds, or of
moving the child to the town's placement which the state agency has de-
termined to be inadequate. Choosing the latter option would contravene
the express congressional policy of consistency and adequacy in a dis-
abled child's education during an IEP contest; should the judicial deci-
sion uphold the State and parents, the child will have spent two and
possibly three years in an inappropriate school. In sum, in order for the
Act to provide appropriate education for disabled children from wealthy
and poor families alike, parents must be entitled to rely on a state admin-
istrative decision in their child's favor, and not be put at risk of reim-
bursement by a judicial judgment which reverses that decision."
Id. at 1222 (quoting School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736
F.2d 773, 800 (1st Cir. 1984), affjd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)). Consequently, the dis-
trict court agreed with the First Circuit's decision in Burlington that the school was
"equitably estopped from challenging the parents' right to require the school to
fund the private placement" as of the date of the administrative decision. Id. (cit-
ing Burlington, 736 F.2d at 801).
236. See Martin K., 831 F. Supp. at 1222 (noting that parents should be per-
mitted to rely on administrative decision in favor of private placement because to
do otherwise would contravene child's right to FAPE).
237. See id. (permitting parents to rely on administrative decision in favor of
private placement as means to assure that children from poor as well as wealthy
families are assured access to FAPE).
238. See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (declining to address issue of school
district's "ability to recover tuition payments from .. .parents should the school
district ultimately prevail").
239. See Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903
F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding in favor of parents' contention that after
administrative decision in favor of parents' unilateral private placement, school
district was responsible for costs of that placement regardless of which party pre-
vailed in case); see also Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 87 n.10 (declining to address repay-
ment issue).
240. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,
373-74 (1985) (holding that when parents unilaterally place child in private school
during pendency of IDEA review proceedings, they do so at their own financial risk
and may only receive tuition reimbursement if court ultimately determines that
1997] CASEBRIEF 1913
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are able to unilaterally change their child's placement without financial
risk. Consequently, it seems likely that if the Third Circuit continues to
rely on Burlington for the rationale behind remedies under the IDEA, the
court will require parents to repay such funds should the school district
ultimately prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit in Susquenita again came down on the side of chil-
dren and their parents. 241 The decision in Susquenita solidifies a child's
right to a FAPE by requiring school districts to pay the costs of a pendent
placement determined by an appeals panel or court to be the appropriate
placement.2 4 2 Although prior IDEA case law in the Third Circuit required
school districts to financially support and maintain pendent placements,
Susquenita solidifies this obligation as immediate in the form of prospec-
tive tuition reimbursement. 243 Consequently, school districts in the Third
Circuit will no longer be able to hide behind the "retroactive tuition reim-
bursement" cloak of Burlington.244 More important, though, children with
disabilities are assured a FAPE regardless of their parents' ability to "front
the costs" of that education. 24 5 Therefore, in the words of the court, par-
ents will now be able to take the educational turnpike without concern
over their financial ability to afford "the toll at the outset.
246
Christine Moyles Kovan
school district's IEP was inappropriate). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington, see supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
241. See Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 (3d Cir. 1996) (award-
ing retroactive tuition reimbursement for school district's failure to maintain pen-
dent placement); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 1994)
(awarding retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents had unilaterally placed
child in private boarding school that was held to be appropriate placement);
Board of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming award of
retroactive tuition reimbursement when parents unilaterally placed child in private
residential setting); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 1982) (awarding
retroactive tuition reimbursement for school district's failure to financially main-
tain pendent placement).
242. Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 86 (holding that although parents who unilaterally
place their child bear initial costs of that placement, school districts' financial re-
sponsibility should begin as soon as there is administrative or judicial decision vin-
dicating parents' placement).
243. See id. (awarding prospective tuition reimbursement).
244. See id. at 84 (rejecting school district's contention that Supreme Court's
decision in Burlington bars prospective tuition reimbursement as restrictive reading
of that case's holding and concluding, therefore, that "a school district may be
required to pay for tuition and expenses associated with a pendent placement
prior to the conclusion of litigation").
245. See id. at 87 (noting that school district had immediate financial responsi-
bility for the appropriate pendent placement).
246. Id.
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